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'Daa-ltingtttn. gl. <!}. 20,?'-t.,;t 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL April 26, 1972 
.. '~ 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. A-1126 (71-1371) - Rosario v. Rockefeller 
Application for stay pending cert. to CA2 
The attached memorandum which we have prepared 
in this case might be of interest in considering the 
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CHAMBERS OF 
'nputm QJ:o-ttrt ltf tirt 'Jnttitt~ .:§tattg 
'Ba.a!rhtgtcn.1tl. Qj:. 2llc?'1;J 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL April 26, 1972 
P~- -~-~1er1, 
~ 1/~ t.--U ~ I 17"'L-
No. A-1126 (71-1371) 
Rosario v. Rockefeller - Application for stay pending cert. to CA2 
Petitioners challenge the provision of New York's .. ...... 
election law that bars them from votin~ in t .he N. Y. presi-
denti a l i)rimary on June 20, 1972. Th~ p~v~~~on defers 
every re istration, for primary purposes only, until after 
t e next eneral electlon. Thus petitioners: who registered 
to vote for the first time in December 1971, will not be 
eligible to vote in a primary until after November 1972. 
They claim this statute bears a heavy burden of justifica-
tion, since it curtails the right t .o vote, and that it is 
no.t narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest, 
citing Dunn v. Blumstein. They also claim it is in effect a 
d~tional residence requirement, with respect to those people 
who move into the state after a general election and before a 
primary -- those people must wait out the prescribed time 
(i.e., until after the next general election) before becoming 
eligible to vote in a primary. (But it does not appear that 
any of the petitioners is in this category--it seems, though 
it is not clear, t .ha t petitioners all belong to the class of 
people who were in fact eligible to register in October, i.e., 
before the last general election, but who simply and in-
advertently failed to do so.) 
The DC agreed with petitioner and issued a declaratory 
judgment striking the statute as unconstitutional. The CA2 
(Lumbard, Mansfield, Mulligan) reversed. Petitioners have 
filed their Petition for Writ of Certiorari and seek a stay 
1 of the mandate pending cert. 
On the merits, petitioners have a substantial claim. 
The only interest a qyanc >Q b y the state is the Q6~venti qp oY 
c~oss-o~r-fraud i n the primar1 es -- the idea is that people 
have to declare their party affiliation for primary purposes 
-2-
before the primary or the general election has gathered 
steam -- indeed, they have to declare their party affiliation 
prior to the next previous general election, which does not 
at all involve the issues presented by the primary and its 
associated general election. No doubt that is a valid state 
interest. But that interest is not at all served by a require- I 
ment that governs not only cross-overs, i.e., changes in party 
af}ili~tion, ~also initial registrations, like petitioners'. 
As applied to first-time voters, the statute s1mply means all 
n~w voters ~ have to sit out one primar~ The statute thus cur-
tails the r1ght of those new voters to vote in primaries, for 
no apparent state interest at all. 
If~ourt acts on the cert. petition ~ef~~e 
Ju~e._2 Q~ then the matter of the stay is unimportant; otherwise, 
of course, it is critical, and should be granted (perhaps with 
some special provision for keeping segregated the votes of the 
voters whose eligibility is in question). 
4/28/72 CEP 
APPLICATION TO STAY THE MANDATE OF CA 2 PENDING ACTION ON 
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI 
No. A"1126 OT 1971 (No. 71-1371) 
Rosario ~· Rockefeller 
Cert to CA 2 (Lumbard, Mansfield & Mulligan) 
~~v~\~~ Marshall has referred this stay application 




We have not yet received the moving papers; the only thing 
we have is the attached memorandum. The obvious solution 
to this problem is to consider the petition for certiorari 
before the end of May. We have already received for 
the May 12 Conference petitions numbered as high as 71-1283; 
71 .. 1371 cannot be far off. In any event, I agree with 
Marshall 0 s recommendation that the stay be granted. 
CEP 
5/27/72 CEP 
SUPPLEMENTAL ON RELISTING 
No. 71-1371 
Rosario y. Rockefeller 
Cert to CA 2 (Lumbard, Mansfield & Mulligan) 
JSCU 
It seems to me that summary disposition is in the 
offing. You notes indicate that TM is to "report 11 on 




MEMORANDUM TO MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
Rea Rosario y. Rockefeller, No. 71-1371 
While the opinion could be clearer, it is narrowly 
written, and its result seems compelled by Dunn y. ~­
stein, You should join, 
CEP 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTI < 
.:§u:pTemt <!J~urt ~f tlrt 'J!!ttitt~ ~tates­
Jlas-4mghm. ~. QJ. 2ll.;t)!..;t 
May 29, 1972 
Re: No. 71-1371 - Rosario v. Rockefeller 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Byron White 1 s memorandum makes a fourth vote 
(to grant cert) in the above case,which alters the 
situation substantially. As a result o£ this Thurgood 
has sent a message through Bill Brennan asking 
that it not go on the Order List Tuesday. Meanwhile 
Bill Rehnquist and I have been collaborating on a 
dissent and would have it complete before five o'clock 
today. 
Thurgood's point-- and it is an important one -- is 
the posture of the case in view o£ the granting of cert 
and requests that a conference be held immediately 
after the Tuesday sitting in order to consider what 
action should be taken, if any. 
Regards, 
.ittJtftutt Qfltltrl 4tf tift 'J!britt~ .itwg 
jlas£ringtMt. ~. <!f. 2DP:J.t..;l 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR. May 29, 1972 
/) 
rio v. Rockefeller 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me in your Per Curiam. 
I 
Sincerely 
Mr. Justice Marshall 




MEMORANDUM TO MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
Res Dunn y_, Blumstein 
This case invelved Tennessee's durational residency 
requirement, There were two conditions to eligibility 
to vote in Tennessee. One was that you had to be a bona 
fide resident of the state. The other was that you had 
to have been a resident for one year in the state and three 
months in the county. This latter condition was the 
durational residency requirement; only its validity was 
at issue. It is undisputed that a requirement that a 
prospective voter be a bona fide resident is constitutional. 
The first part of the opinion deals with the standard 
of review. After extensive discussion, the Court concludes 
that the exacting standard of equal protection review is 
appropriate: to withstand constitutional scrutiny, a 
statute placing a condition on the right to vote must be 
1
, necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest. (Em-
phasis in opinion), This standard is appropriate, the Court 
concludes, because votli:.ng is a fundamental right" because 
durational requirements impinge on the constitutional right 
to travel, The Court then notes that under this standard 
of review, a heavy burden rests with the state to justify 
the restriction, and the statute will be closely scru-
tinized in light of its asserted purpose. The purpose 
must be served by the least drastic means - the state must 
further its interest by a means that least interferes 
with constitutionally protected rights. In other words, 
the statute must be narrowly tailored to serve the state 
interest, with the minimum possibl~ burden on the protected 
I 
rights. 
With respect to the offerred justification that the! 
durational residency requirement maintained the purity 
of the bal l ot box and prevented election fraud, the Court 
held that the waiting period was not the least restrictive 
means necessary for preventing fraud, noting that the crim-
inal law could accomplish this purpose. 
With respect to the offerred justification that the 
durational r esidency requirement was essential to assure 
"knowledgable voters," the Court held that this device 
was simply too crude to accomplish the goal. 
In this case, the vice of the statute is that it 
reaches too far. In seeking to prevent "raiding" and 
"cross-overs" by imposing its own "durational" requirement, 
this statute denies the right to vote to people who are 
incapable of crossing-over simply because they have never 
before registered to vote(¢,"" beeav.se ..ft.~ jvs+ nwveJ hrb 4k. ..stllie-) .: 
I think that the case is clear. It is indistinguishable 
in principle from~. You asked me, however, how the 
Court will decide it. That I cannot predict. There has 
been a disquieting tendency this Term to distinguish prece-
dents on ephemeral grounds that have nothing to do with the 
principles for which they stand. This could happen to 
Dunn. White was in the Qgnn majority, and his adherence to 
precedent in the area of voting law is minimal, 
CEP 
MIMOJIAI1)t.JW 70 !II COUUII 
. • s ..... rco, .I\-:lli!. -, ~•rY. •: ... ~~f•l;J.•r 
1 • cbhctaa ., YOte 1 tb1a c••• ttl 
not•· prollabl• Jv.t.,t.otioa..., ba a...-...t. 
llal••• OM ot ~ o\l,•r tbfiM who votw tb1a 
.. , cMacu b18 alftd,. _,YOU .kM tbe touth 




A.lt.hougb it la prObably U.,lielt :f~ our dU1cuaa1m 
t fenmee 1 :rni .. 1 Yiev of em •• eheage f 
te ta thia c 1 l ...,., ,..,t.• :to gran ~ iorarl • 
Mal: • \'U!Mtl'lt 'th•· .. r-.t.t•, ratber than vot:lag to deny 
certiorari. 
No. 71-1.371 ROSARIO v. ROCKEFELLER Argued 12/13/72 
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j)u.prmte <!fond of tlre2Jniteb ~tutes­
w~u;lfhtgtctn. p. ~· 21lpJ~2 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS January 4, 1973 
Dear Chief: 
As respects No. 71-1371, ~o~io 
v. Rockefeller -- the opinion you assigned 
to Potter -- I have talked with Lewis and 
he vlill undertake the dissent. 




William 0. Douglas 
j 
No. 71-1371 Rosario v. Rockefeller 
Justices, has requested that I write the dissent in this case. , 
~s this was one of your eases, I would appreciate your draft-
' iDg a dissent - which you and I had in mind anyway. 
fl .. 
is writing ~or the Court. ~, . (;· 
.§u.prtmt Qf!tttrt cf t4t 'Jttnittb .§taftg 
2Jira:5frhtghm, ~. <q. 2!l~Jl·~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
January 8, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1371 - Rosario v. Rockefeller 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, ~J 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
,Stt}trtttte <ronrt of t11c 'ltllitd~ ~ta~s 
1 'J!Da!.l'Irhtgton, ~. ~· 2tl,(i'~;3 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
January lOJ 1973 
Re: No. 71-1371- ROSARIO v. ROCKEFELLER 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me. 
SincerE!'lyJ 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to Conference 
Memo to: Jay Wilkinson 
From: Lewis F. Powell, ,Jr. 
Re: No. 71-1371 Rosario v. Rockefeller 
January 10, 1973 
These are a few random comments on Justice Stewart's 
opinion, which I have just read rather hurriedly for the first time. 
The opinion describes quite vaguely the alleged grounds 
of unconstitutionality. At page 4 it states that petitioners rely on "their 
right to vote" and abridgement of their "freedom to associate with the 
political party of their choice." I have not looked at any of the authorities 
recently, although I am generally familiar with Dunn and Carter. In Dunn, 
a durational residence requirement was held invalid under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause -the class being persons who had moved into the state and 
were caught by a one-year residence requirement. Also in Dunn, the 
Court applied the compelling state interest test on the ground that a classi-
fication that interfered with the right to vote is "suspect." 
Justice Stewart does not use equal protection analysis in his 
opinion, although on page 5 he refers to the "class to which petitioner belongs" 
as being "newly registered voters who were eligible to enroll in a party before 
the previous general election." 
-2-
He does not discuss - as I read his opinion - the issue as 
to whether the test is compelling or simply rational basis. He is of course 
keenly aware of what was held in Dunn, as he was with the majority. I have 
been a bit puzzled as to why this question was not addressed specifically. 
He does characterize the state's purpose as serving "an important state 
goal," and as being "a legitimate and valid state goal. " (Page 9. ) 
I am personally not enthusiastic about extending the compelling 
state interest test beyond the present scope of our decisions. It may be 
that Dunn is- or fairly may be considered- controlling authority that where 
the right to vote (including right to vote in a primary) is restricted- the 
compelling interest test applies. I would prefer, however, to write this 
case in that "intermediate zone" which we applied in Weber and Strange -
if we can conclude that this is a principled basis. 
A few additional observations: 
I agree with Justice Stewart (note 8) that petitioners lack 
standing to raise the "right to travel" issue. 
The gut issue - which prompted me to vote as I did - is 
addressed by Justice Stewart on page 7: that the time limitation is so severe 
as itself to constitute an unconstitutionally onerous burden on petitioners' 
exercise of the right to vote. This period is eight months in a presidential 
primary and eleven months in a non-presidential primary. I personally 
-3-
see no reason, rational or otherwise, for such lengthy periods. Yet, I 
have a reluctance to say that there is no rational basis for a law which 
New York has had on its books for sixty years. I would recognize a 
state interest in imposing reasonable limitations on party "cross-overs," 
but eight to eleven months preregistration provisions seem quite un-
reasonable. 
I have not checked petitioners' briefs, but I hope they con-
tain information as to whether any other states have such onerous restrictions 
on party registration. As you know, in Virginia we have none - and until 
recently managed to get along fairly well. Virginia's experience the last 
few years is, however, suggestive of the need for some sort of registration 
law. 
I wonder if the library here at the Court, or the Library of 
Congress, would respond to an inquiry on my behalf for an analysis of 
state election laws with respect to how far in advance of a party primary 
must party affiliation be declared by registration. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
LFP, Jr. :pls 
P. S. I have just looked at Justice Blackmun' s concurring opinion in Dunn 
v. Bloomstein. It rather suggests that it is unnecessary to apply the com-
pelling state interest test - although I am not entirely clear as to where his 
opinion comes down. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
,Stqtrtutt (!}:curl of tfrt ~ttittb ..§f:attg 
Jraslrhtghm. ~. (!}:. 20,?'!~ 
January 17, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1371 - Rosario v. Rockefeller 
Dear Potter: 
Unless Lewis persuades me mightily to the contrary, 
I am with you. 
Sincerely, 
;f.().~. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
/ 
J.BP/SS 1/ HS/ '/;j lCC 
No. 71-1371 ROSARIO v. ROCKEFELLER 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
I 
It is important at the outset to place New York's cutoff 
' 
date for party enrollment in perspective. 
~~ 
It prevents 1 d d b 
~ 
voters from registering for a party primary i11i1i!J eight months 
before a Presidential primary and eleven months before a non-
1 
Presidential one. The Court recognizes, as it must, that the 
period between the enrollment deadline and the primary election 
2 
is a "lengthy" one. Indeed, no other state has imposed upon 
voters previously unaffiliated with any party restrictions which . 
3 
evene approach in severity those of New York. And New York 
concedes that only one other state - Kentucky - , has imposed as 
stringent a primary registration deadline on persons with prior 
4 
party affiliations. Confronted with such a facially burdensome 
J 
2. 
The right of all persons to vote, once the state has decided 
J.-lv<-
to make it available to some, becomes a basic one under~ ;1 
Constitution. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. 
Union Frre School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Carrington v. 
Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965). Self-expression through the public ballot 
~ ..e~ v( a-~~~<-<.- ' 
equally with one's peers isJ:Pi8RUy tMflU~Htb in · ts ::tstsh ~4(. 
Reynolds v. Sims, 
377 u. s. 533 ( 1964). 
,~~ 
AlMM ~without a vote is to a large extent 
Rider A, p. 2 (Rosario) 1/21/73 
,.,,.ltoiJ~ o.. sf.f,J._ 
Yet the Court today •flfll 8\ 18 tis 1 lh tt Y••~rraidahry 
~llnnte which imposes substantial and unnecessary restrictions 
on this right, as well as on the closely related right to associate 
with the party of one's choice. See Williams v. Rhoads, 393 U.s. 
23 (1968); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); United states 
e.~r-
v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967). The m&juiiy 8tJHd8R justifies this 
holding by placing the responsibility upon petitioners for their 
eight months 
ri~t to as 
35M. 
•, 
We are told l'Opoateelly that petitioners"clearly could have registered 
and••-• enrolled in the party of their choice" before the cutoff 
date and been eligible to vote in the primary, but for undetermined 
f 7'-e'~< 
reasons "chose not td~ ,.{7and that their disenfranchisement~·--.,__ 
1\ 
e,nrollment.r e cutoff date were a less severe one, I could 
__.,.,.,. 
agree. Certainly, the state is justified in imposing a reasonable 
regist r ation cutoff - prior to any primary or general election, 
~. ·~ ~ ~-j.~l .......... .( vv "- 'd.t 
beyond which a citizen's failure to register) i.s a negligen~ 
;.;,-~ 
forfeiting his right to vote in a particular election. But 
b se · fc, 
d~t-.Jc p1""-<-tZ.~  fe.t"SC.&.•.SI~C. 'Ia~ ,._, ~ 
registration or party enrollment deadline eight 
.,... · t· n , ifc~ c.__. _,t~ ·r•~kt. 
1 ~ J c,..s • l"'J ,..oolillmi!ij~s~s.;.hiinWjli _. . .. A • • ._ d · l Ci t · t t · l · ai:..fs. I! ' ~ • .... :~ ; sg en1a cons 1 u wna Flgn - 4:m:rrAQ 1 a ,; .. 
~
"" 




continuing availability of the franchise fqr all citizens, not to 
;t.s d . t• j • sanction prolonged infringement or epr1va wn. 
Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 37 (1879), Nixon v. Herndon, 273 
u.s. 536 (1927); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Baker v. 
Carr, 369 u.s. 189 (1962); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); 
Rider A, p. 4 (Rosario) 1/21/73 
tA.fJ'•~• ,.+I:J 
majority accepts the state's contention that this is 
6 [or 7] 
disenfranchising statute'~ as it does not absolutely 
d. enfranchise petitioners or impose anJ absolute ba on their 
lrreedom of association. It is true, of course, that the thrust of 
/ 
a er th. senfranchise altogether. 
Yet deferment of a right, especially one as sensitive and essential 
as the exercise of the firstynty of citizenship, can be serious ) 
enough to equate denial. The deferral, compelling registration 
and chaise of party affiliation eight months or more in advance 
of a primacy, can have an inhibitinp - indeed a disenfranchising 
effect - on those who for q_uite legitimate reasons may wish to 
5. 
-, 
~ a&80C'i:atlon~ rights. 
o." .. ~~o/ .... te ~~c.e. c. dce.s 
months on party enrollment and voting registration klili liln s'hPi8ttB 
those who, for quite legitimate 
reasons, decide to register .. closer than eight months to the 
primary date and •lilllilllil.~lil-,e those who, for equally 
legitimate reasons, 
affiliation. Our decisions have never• required an absolute ban on 
the exercise of constitutional rights before a constitutional breach 
is incurred. Rather, they have uniformly recognized that :s: a 
eo ... st;t~~-.11 
serious burden or infringement on " protected activity" 
is sufficient to establish a constitutional violation, Dunn v. -Blumstein, 
supra at __ , NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 419, 438 (1963); Harper 
v. Virginia Board of Elections, supra at __ ..., , for the @k ofdtbL 
, 
$ J Pte It: 
J 
II 
• j ' 'J~ I /-~...(_ 
~r~ ~~standard of scrutiny The majority-fails to m.ake e 
~ • t ent ollment J.1.A- k~Bgthy cutoff date for par Y . t New Yor 
it apphes ~ . s 
1 that the cutoff date 1 We are told on y 
.. "not an arbitrary 1 ted to any important t. me limit unc onnec 
"timate purpose 9 . . "t"ed to a particularized legi al·" that 1t 1S 1 
state go ' 10 ot 
" The Court does n . "d"ous or arbitrary. and is in no sense mv1 1 
Bider A, p. 6 (Rosario) 1/21/73 
6. 
If 
r~ / / 
This language resembles, t]]ougn the terminology is somewhat 
strQnger, the traditional equal~ protection "rational basis" 
tJ lt...:t e.~ 7 _,.,-
test. In some cases lllll!le we hav-e elected, where dealing with 
. IJ...:f S i--.T e. ? 
__. f.tl £d; .~ • 
state action not prev-iously identified With either of the frequently -----------____, 
applied standards, to judge the v-alidity of a challenged act or 
---- --< (->to.F~s• ""':! classification ithout categorizing the standard or tes~;ie:: ::) 
-
But here the prior decisions of the Court hav-e firmly identified 
the right to v-ote as fundamental in a constitutional sense, requiring 
7. 
'irue..,..+tl\t) ,, 1, 
in 5lr d party raiding. But this Court's prior decisions t simply 
do not permit <111-aiMIII*- -IIJI .. t such an approach. Rather, they recognize 
that: 
" ... the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter 
in a free and democratic society. Especially since 
the right to exercise the franchise in a free and 
unimpaired manner is preservative of A:"ls• basic 
civil and political rights, any alleged infringement 
of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully 
and meticulously scrutinized. Reynolds v. Sims, 
supra, at 561- 562. See also Yick Wo v. Ho:PitiiiS, 
118 u.s. 356 (1886). 
Voting in a party primary is as protected against state 
encroachment as voting in a general election. ..._Bullock v. 
Carter, supra, at _; Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); 
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). And the Court has 
said quite explicitly that "if a challenged statute ~s--~111• grants 
the right to vote to some citizens and denies the franchise to others, 
'the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary 
I It 
to promote a compelling state interest~ Dunn v. Blumstein, 
supra, at (1972) quoting Kramer v. Union Free School District, 
supra, at 627. See also Cipriano v. City of Houma, supra, at 

704 (1969); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, supra, at 205, 209 
(1970). 
I..;Jc•..,IS._/ • 
a Tb w b tks S' Ill difiJliliJ&l 5 I IIi •· 2 
a.sse~fe.J .,._.., -tlt ... "'f' 
Court has •un• • RIIJ.Ilii·J h *b a s*s dnud £ s 
the 
"the 4 
right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political 
beliefs" is "among our most precious freedoms" Williams v. 
Rhodes, 
8. 
from state encroachment. NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 449 (1958). 
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); Gibson v. Florida 
Legislative Investigations Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963). 
whether the instant statute, 
burdening as it does.fb~t~tical rights, is 
necessary to advance a compelling state interest. 
state interest in this case is ' the preventi n of party "raiding" 
~ 
~~,_•r -~"~ 
which consists of members ift HYM~at:br mitR. ne party~ into 
" 
another's primary to "defeat a candidate who is adverse to the . 
-:}? c.-.s:f~ ~,.... .. 
11 •.::If~., •~ ... t so .Ill pa 
interests they care to advanc~ he compelling nature of 
any interest cannot be detern!:ined in a vacuum, but llllil rather 
~1M."-
in the context of the meanH advan~P.d hv thP. ~bt,:1 tn n-rnt,:1t>t it !lnrl 
9. 
and the constitutionally sensitive activity it operates to impede. 
• ) ~J,(., ~ /-'t.....J.._ 
11,,_ sf.te i>te~ h<'<- ~ (.~"'-11<-- (_ _._  lo 
~R.is intoPeot is1W 1.1e compellin~lto sustain the pre sump 10 , k ~
~te ·€:. ~- U:J .~ ~J..4A.-
esta:Glishe.d tocihe otatate, that ~e who change; or declare; 
-k 
party affiliation nearer than eight~ eleven mont to a party 
11?1 s ... J- re..!>u""'rt;-. ~~ ..-.rr e.. nc.eelles!!.l~ S•l!•.sre ... o-d c.om.ple.-,. vi~w 
t' !J r "~ow .. i'ofi'H' ,,f/ ~t . 1!t;f;c,J ftJ..v-ties 
If":rimary do• so with intent to raid that primary. Politiaal.-pa;rties 
'-"" 
i't\ ~:.s Co"...;,, "'"e 'tV'~J;t;o._.Jij hef',._ c~AYo..d'~ .. ijeJ 6.:1' P/IA;J:r!J 
.jo this ceunt-r~trad1t1onally~~ b-y a £luidi~nd 
, fu~ ~~J otf~~l6.p of fl,;/os•pH!J G.""-~ 1tt.e•il~r.s~:p • 
O¥QPlap of pb.Uosophy and member-Bl+.ip. generally declare 
<t:r alter party affiliation for reasons quite unconnected with ~ 
da.>~ta. c H.e. i Jeresf S b F 
a par ty with which they are 
i )\, ;f..s 
not in sympathy. 
• 
~~ 
responsive to their n~eot intimate concerns and :11p aspiration~•l ... .,.. ...... ~ • ., 
oj t e. n o-re.. "YY• T t:Lff>A¥"1: ~~ 
1 1 ~ .... cJ.., ().""J:J,Je.s ot" i.ssa..u,... ~,. «1 ..... t1..- •• ueptd a I a 
..i4!l.W.a•w.w.• Yet · · 
& ff at do._ ;" fie trJ/<: J''' I n..-.;~'?1 Jo ~ r •~ -a-'f'e •o 
) 
10. 
BJ lAiAr. . feve.r s.tJe... .,'1'\te.~e.!:.-r e-<i!t"t.s PoV"" prt."e.~t'i~J c. .. os.s·ollc..~.J 
..li;.Jjl;ji~n~a~l~~~r:: ~ 1 2 g· •~tate ~reM ill r;r evenHng &ldling.-
r:' of"O .....,_ .,-n C... p .._ ...... .:::3 -1'i "-. "Y\ <' t=~ 4,. V'"' 
~· M-1 
is lessened where, as in the case of petitioners, there has been 
" 
no previous affiliation with any political party. The danger of 
voters in sympathy with one party "raiding" another party is 
~t.-<...o)~ 
insubstantial where the voter has declared no pr'evious expression 
~~ 4.( t pi' oA1. . 
of party sympathy at all. Certainly, the danger falls short of the 
compelling state interest needed to justify denying petitioners, 
so far in advance, the right to declare an initial party affiliation 




In ~' supra, at __ , the Court emphasized that the 
state, in pursuing* its legitimate interests,d' a 
•cannot chose means which unnecessarily burden or 
restrict constitutionally protected activity. ·. · Statutes 
affecting constitutional rights must be drawn with 
'precisio~ NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 419, 438 
(1963 ); Un1ted States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 
(1967), and must be 'tailored' to serve their 
legitimate objectives. Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, 
394 U.S. at 631. And if there are other, reasonable 
ways to achieve these goals with a lesser burden on 
c onstitutionally4" protected activity, a State may not 
choose the way of greater interference. If it acts 
at all, it must choose'less drastic means. •' • 
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). 
The Court states that placing the enrollment deadline before 
the preceding general election serves well the state interest in 
12 -1-t.J a.~~ 1.-
discouraging party "raiding. " This failsMl-ffill~~, -to-question 
whether that interest may be adequately protected by less severe 
measures. A foreshortening of the challenged period in this 
case would not leave the party structure of New York helpless and 
vulnerable to "raiding" activities. The other states, with varied 
and complex party systems, have well maintained them without 
the advanced enrollment deadline imposed by New Yorfi::j/Political 
12. 
activities do not constantly engage the attention of Arne ricans. 
apmps* g ·q mu p1I1J to enter another party's primary to 
and loyalties generally are said to hold less sway over voter; g"''\
5
• ,..,_ ~ 
b¥~~~~~-·~~~ 0~ 
shortened enrollment deadline may not screen iii every 
"raider" that the present deadline does, • • judr!fia8 fa 7 H I 
-~-----~~~•••• • "raiding" would remain a ..-. · d t T,; ~ I .J. I I t . +• 
I /f I ·f•er •'o·- ld ..... _,..,/c..o""- fh t;.y.._c,-,f'r.~,_:, &'a~•tC~ 1 
I' "'"'"rtd po , it;... f6',. • .., ~ - "- ---=-' 
manageable probleiiJ What is most important, a "less drastic" 
for legitimate party participation to those who. constitutionally 

FOOTNOTES 
1. October 2, 1971, was the last day on which petitioners' enrollment 
could have been effective. June 20, 1972, was the date of New York's 
presidential primary. Thus the deadline was actually some eight and 
one-half months before the primary. In non-presidential years, the 
cut-off runs from early October until the following September. 
2. Court opinion, p. 8. 






4 . Tr. of Oral Arg. , p. 34 . 
-2-
5. Court opinion, pp. 5, 6. See also p. 10 where the Court refers 
to section 186 as merely imposing "a legitimate time limitation 
on their (petitioners') enrollment, which they chose to disregard." 
6. See the Court's opinion at p. 5: 
Similarly at p. 6: 
. I 
and p. 10: 
In all these instances, the majority seeks to distinguish what it 
chooses to call a mere "time limitation" from an absolute disen-
franchisement of petitioners or an absolute ban on their associational 
rights. 
7 . Tr. of Oral Arg. , p. 3 5. 
8. Court opinion, p. 7. 
-3-
9. Court opinion, p. 8. 
10 o Id. p. 9. 
11. Tr. of Oral Arg. p. 29. 
12. Court Opinion, p. 9. I. 
13. Petitioners also suggest other "less drastic" means of protecting 
the state's interest: greater reliance on the summary dis enrollment 
p rocedures of Section 332 of the State's election law and loyalty oaths, 
' ' 
restrictive party affiliation rules optional for those parties who wish 
them, limitation of the statute's operation to persons with preexisting 
party affiliations, and criminal sanctions for fraudulent participation 
in the electoral process. Tr. of Oral Arg. pp. 13-21. I made no 
judgment either on the efficacy of these alternatives in protecting the 
state's interest or on their potential infringement of constitutionally 
protected rights. Their presence, however, points to the range and 
variety of other experimental techniques which might be less destructive 
of constitutional rights. 
.. 
""-




Yet the Court today approves the New Yorlt statutory 
scheme which imposes substantial and unnecessary restrictions 
on this right, as well as on the closely related right to associate 
with the party of one's choice. See Williams v. Rhoads, 393 U. S. 
23 (1968); NAA'2_!' v. Ala~ma, 357 U.s. 449 (1958); United States 
v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967). The majority opinion justifies this 
holding by placing the responsibility upon petitioners for their 
failure to enroll, as permitted by New York law, eight months 
prior to the presidential primary. 
(Note to .Jay: I am not sure that this rider is expressed 
iil"tiie best possible way. It is a substitute for the first 
sentence in the paragraph beginning at the bottom of 
page 2, which seems to me to require a revision. Perhaps 
you can come up with a better alternative.) 
!!!<!er &_ p. 4 (Hosario) 1/21/73 
The majority accepts the state's contention that this is 
6 [or 7] 
"not a disenfranchising statute" as it does not absolutely 
disenfranchise petitioners or impose any absolute ban on their 
freedom of association. It is true, of course, that the thrust of 
the statute is to postpone rather than disenfranchise altogether. 
Yet deferment of a right, especially one as sensitive and essential 
as the exercise of the first duty of citizenship, can be serious 
enough to equate denial. The deferral, compelling registration 
and choise of party affiliation eight months or more in advance 
of a primary, can have an inhibiting- indeed a disenfranchising 
effect - on those who for quite legitimate reasons may wish to 
defer choosing or changing their party affiliation. 
Rider A, p. 6 (Rosario) 1/21/73 
I 
This language resembles, though the terminology is somewhat 
stronger, the traditional equal pxtowx protection "rational basis" 
test. In some cases Jlirli!ICe we have elected, where dealing with 
state action not previously identified with either of the frequently 
applied standards, to judge the validity of a challenged act or 
classification without categorizing the standard or test applied.* 
But here the prior decisions of the Court have firmly identified 
the right to vote as fundamental in a constitutional sense, requiring 
the applicability of strict judicial review: 
*Jay: -Cite Fmes v. Strange, Weber and the Harvard Law Review 
article discussing the intermediate type standard. 
.. ... 
TO: ,~i Mr. J . Harvie Wilk~son, 
jj; 
FROM: ~ Lewis F~J~ Powell, Jr. 
~ .. ''"-"'~;~' ~~. ~ ... :t~ ""' 1., ~ ! 
71-1371 Rosario v. Rockefeller 
Sally will deliver to you your first draft, which I have reviewed 
rather hurriedly today. I did not have an opportunity to take a look at it 
previously. 
1I have suggested some tentative changes, including several :kiida::ia: 
~~ ~ 
viewpoint of style and clarity. ,J. have not undertaken to do this either, 
~fl:o+~ ·'I!'~.'" 
·~-~'in view of pressures of my getting off to Delray. 
,1•. Constitutional violation. Nowhere do we specifically identify 
~. 
the constiutional violation . . , ~s it equal protection or due process or 
something else? You and I discussed, briefly, whether this was an equal 




,.I have not had time to reexamine the briefs or the opinion below 
-~ ~-
3. 
now being applied by the Court, namely, strict sbdiny where a fundamental 
right or a suspect class is involved, and only the need for some rational 
basis in other situations. 
My suggested rider on page 6 moves cautiously into this area. 
Justice stewart may well be trying to occupy the middle ground identified 
by Prof. Gunther. I personally like the middle ground and do not want to 
mold deeper into "concrete" the present dichotomy between the two 
establis,H~d standards. See what you can do with a footnote as well as 
the text on page · 6 that would tie in with the Gunther article idea, leaving 
our options open. In this. case, we are bound by precedent to apply the 
strict standard test. My thought is that we migtlt simply - in a note -
indicate that the two prevailing tests need not always be applied, 
demonstrated in James v. strange and Weber. 
* * * * * 
My suggestion is that you make such revisions, 
pblishing as you think necessary. Then have the printer do a half a 
dozen "chambers copies" of a first draft, and mail it to me airmail. 
I will then clear it with you on the telephone, 
irculate during my absence. 
I think you have done a splendid piece of work, especially considering 




as being involved in the case, without making it at all clear as to what ,~ 
' section of the Constitution is violated. 
I think the analysis in our opinion should be more specific. 
would guess that a reexamination of some of the prior precedents would 
''"h 
.,, give you appropriate guidance.~ This is not a major revision task, but "' 
merely one of identification. 
"'..'[.':. 
2. Judge Lumbard's opinion. As you know, Judge Lumbard is 
,,_. .t .,,. -J01'"''i-' . ,. ' ' ~- ~· ' -~-"<• ~l!J-;i.'~-' 
.;,., widely regarded .as ,one of the 'ablest judges in-the country. tAs we would 
t; ~- - ~ • :,, ·fl·~·, - '<!: ••. :~1#·~., ~~ ~'-· L . 1.~:-'i.P;"·-. ~' ~-
>)0 
.( reverse his opinion, ;I would like - at least -to address fairly the 
,.. ~ ~u ~ 
. ' 
arguments 'if~'!lhlakes. ;;: You might reread his opinion and consider what 
... ;Jf\~~~ .. ~~'-:ij,. -~J , 1 • 
~>- .,~-~-~- ~~ 
additions, if any, should oo ~make to ours~ · 
~ ' l,lli~ 
I thin~-~ :l:a~~j~'' you should note - perli~~s in ui·~. Section of our . 
opinion discussing the failure of Justice stewart to identify the applicable 
l,riiU'.'. ~- ."lil '"' ~~ ~- ' ' ·.l 
~· standard - that Jud~ Lumbard assumes that the· ' ~compelling state interest" 
I l< J'.:!;i_ 't~. ·,~~- _;· ~· ..Jil >!!f.. >'' ,9 ~" J 
test must be applied. He then goes on to find that New York's interest 
''is compelling! 1I know of no precedent for such a finding, and wonder 
~t '!"o~<'ll 
l whether he has cited any. 
•t- ~ 
You directed my attention 
[:\' :J'!f-' 
to Professor Gunther's analysis in the November Harvard Law Review, 
in which he commented favorably on what he perceived to be a trend 
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2nd DRAFT ( ¥- ) 
SUPREME COURT O:F THE UNITED STATES 
Xo. 71-1371 
Pedro J. Rosario et al., 
Petitioners, 
v. 
Nelson Rockefeller, Governor 
of the State of New 
York, et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari to 
the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit. 
[February -, 1973] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting. 
] 
It is important at the outset to place New York's cut-
off date for party enrollment in perspective. It prevents 
prospective voters from registering for a party primary 
some eight months before a presidential primary and 11 
months before a nonpresidential one.1 The Court rec-
ognizes, as it must, that the period between the enroll-
ment and the primary election is a "lengthy" one. 2 In-
deed, no other State has imposed upon voters previously 
unaffiliated with any party restrictions which even ap-
proach in severity those of New York. 3 And New York 
1 October 2, 1971, was the last day on which petitioners' enrollment 
could have been effective. June 20, 1972, was the date of New York's 
presidential primary. Thus tho deadline was actually some eight 
and one-half months before tho primary. In nonpre~idential year~, 
tho cutoff runs from early October until the following September. 
~ Court opinion, p. 8. 
3 The State does not dispute this point. See Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 34. 
Massachusetts, Illinois, Ohio, New Jersey, and TC'xas permit pro-
Yiously unaffiliated voters to declare their initial party affiliation 
immediately prior to voting in the primary of their choice. See 
Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, c. 53,§§ 37, 38; Illinois Annotated 
Statutes, §§ 5-30; 7-43-7-45; New Jersey Statute;; Annotated, 
71-1:371-DISSE?\T 
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concedes that only one other State-Kentucky-has im-
posed as stringent a primary registration deadline on 
persons with prior party affiliations.' Confronted with 
such a facially burdensome requirement, I find the Court's 
opinion unconvincing. 
The right of all persons to vote, once the State has 
decided to make it available to some, becomes a basic 
one under the Constitution. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 
U. S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 
395 U. S. 621 (1969); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89 
( 1965). Self-expression through the public ballot equally 
with one's peers is the essence of a democratic society. 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 r. S. 533 (1964). A citizen with-
out a vote is to a large extent one without a voice in 
decisions which may profoundly affect him and his family. 
Whatever his disagreement may be with the judgments 
of public officials, the citizen should never be given just 
cause to think that he was denied an equal right to 
elect them. 
Yet the Court today upholds a statute which imposes 
substantial ancl unnecessary restrictions on this right, 
as well as on the closely related right to associate ,...-ith 
the party of one's choice. Sec Williams v. Rhodes, 393 
U. S. 23 ( 1968); XAA CP "· Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 
Hl::2:3-45; Vrrnon'~ Annolatrd Trxa~ StatutrH, Tit. 9, Art. 1:3.01a; 
Ohio Rrvisrd Codr, § 351:3.19. 
California and Pcnn~ylvania prrmit prrviou~ly unafliliatccl vot rr~ 
to drdarc an initial part.1· prrfcrenrc \Ill to the c!o~c of rrp;i~tration 
immrdiatel~· prerrding thr primar~·. Califomia Election CoclP, §§ :22, 
20:3, :311-:312 (rrp;i::;tration do~r~ in California 53 cla~·~ bPforP a 
primar~·); Purdon'~ Prnn,:~·Ivania Statutr~ AnnotatPd. Tit. 25, §§ 291 
et seq. (rPp;i~tration do~<'~ in J'pnn~~·Ivnnia 50 days before a 
primm·~·). 
:\Jirhip;an permit~ an~· registered voter to pnrtirip;1 te in the pri-
m:u·~· of his rhoirP. l\Iirhignn Compiled Laws Annotated,§§ 161'.570, 
l()S.575-16S.576. Sre Petitioner~' Brief, pp. 32-33. 
' Tr. of Ornl Arg., p. 34. 
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(1958); United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967) . 
The Court justifies this holding by placing the responsi-
bility upon petitioners for their failure to enroll, as 
required by New York law, eight months prior to the 
presidential primary. We are told that petitioners 
"clearly could have registered and enrolled in the party 
of their choice" before the cutoff date and been eligible 
to vote in the primary, but for undetermined reasons 
"chose not to," and that their disenfranchisement re-
sulted from "their own failure to take timely steps to 
effect their enrollment." " 
If the cutoff date were a less severe one, I could agree. 
Certainly, the State is .i ustified in imposing a reasonable 
registration cutoff prior to any primary or general elec-
tion, beyond which a citizen's failure to register may be 
presumed a negligent or wilful act forfeiting his right 
to vote in a particular election. But it is difficult to 
perceive any persuasive basis for a registration or party 
enrollment deadline eight to 11 months prior to election. 
Failure to comply with such an extreme deadline can 
hardly be used to justify denial of a basic constitutional 
right. Numerous prior decisions impose on us the obli-
gation to protect the continuing availability of the fran-
chise for all citizens, not to sanction its prolonged de-
ferment or deprivation. E.x parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 
37 (1879); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 5,35 (1927); Lane 
v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
189 (1962); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368 (1963); 
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v. 
Sims, supra; Carrington v. Rash, supra; Harper v. Vir-
ginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1966); Kramer 
v. Union Free School District, supra; Cipriano v. City 
5 Court opinion, pp. 5, 6. Sec also p. 10 where the Court refcro; 
to § 186 a1:1 merely imposing "<t legitimate I ime limitation on their 
rpctitioner::>' 1 enrollment, which they chose to di~regard." 
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of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Evans v. Cornman, 398 
U. S. 419 (1970); City of Phoenix v. Kolod.ziejski, 399 
U.S. 204 (1970); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); 
Dunn v. Blumstein, supra. 
The majority excuses the challenged statute because 
it does not "absolutely" disenfranchise petitioners or im-
pose any absolute ban on their freedom of association.6 
The State likewise contends this is "not a disenfranchis-
mg statute." 7 The Court apparently views this stat-
ute as postponing rather than denying altogether peti-
H See the Court's opinion, at p. 5: 
"Section 186 of Nrw York'8 Election Law, however, is quite different. 
It did not absolutely disenfranchise tho class to which the petitioners 
belong-newly regi8tered voters who were eligible to enroll in a 
party before the previous general election. Rather, the statutes 
merely imposed a time deadline on their enrollment, which they had 
to meet in order to participate in the next primary." 
Similarl~r at p. 6: 
"The petitioners do not say why they did not rnroll prior to the 
cutoff date, but it is clear that they could have done so, but chose 
not to. Hence, if their plight can be charartrrizrd as di,;enfranchise-
mcnt at all, it was not caused by § 186, but by their own failure to 
take timely steps to effect their enrollment. 
"For the same reason, wr reject the petitioners' argument that § 186 
violated their First and Fourthteenth Amendment right of free asso-
ciation with the political party of their choice. Since they could 
have enrolled in a party in time to participate in the June 1972 
primary, § 186 did not constitute a ban on their freedom of associa-
tion, but merely a time limitation on when they had to act in order 
to participate in their chosen party's next primary." 
And p. 10: 
"New York did not prohibit the petitioners from voting in the 1972 
primary election or from associating with the political party of their 
choice. It merely imposed a legitimate time limita,tion on their 
enrollment, which they chose to disregard." 
In a.ll these instances, the majority seeks to distinguish a "time lim-
itation" from an absolute disenfranchisement of petitioners or an 
absolute ban on their associational rights. 
7 Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 35. 
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tioners' voting and associational rights.8 I cannot agree. 
Deferment of a right, especially one as sensitive and 
essential as the exercise of the first duty of citizenship, 
can be tantamount to its denial. And any statute which 
imposes for eight or 11 months an absolute freeze on 
party enrollment and the consequent right to vote does 
disenfranchise those who, for quite legitimate reasons, 
decide to register closer than eight months to the primary 
date and those who, for equally legitimate reasons, wish 
to c 1ang or alter party affiliation. Our decisions, how-
~::_.5z.._-e;;v;-;,e~r:-,]:h;-::a~v;;;:e never required a permanent ban on the exercise 
of voting and associational rights before a constitutional 
breach is incurred. Rather, they have uniformly recog-
nized that a serious burden or infringement on such 
"constitutionally protected activity" is sufficient to estab-
lish a constitutional violation, Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, 
at 343; NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 419, 438 (1963); 
Reynolds v. Sims, supra, at 561-562, f t e reason 
ti.a s ~@.I as 
II 
The majority does not identify the standard of scru-
tiny it applies to the New York statute. We are told 
only that the cutoff date is "not an arbitrary time limit 
unconnected to any important state goal"; 9 that it is 
"tied to a particularized legitimate purpose and is in no 
sense invidious or arbitrary." 10 The Court does not 
explain why this formulation was chosen, what precedents 
support it, or how and in what contexts it is to be ap-
plied. Such nebulous promulgations are bound to leave 
the lower courts and state legislatures in doubt and con-
" Court opinion, p. 7. 
"Court opinion, p. 8. 
10 I d., p. 9. 
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fusion as to how "·e will approach future significant bur-
dens on the right to vote and to associate freely with the 
party of one's choice. 
The Court's formulation, though the terminology is 
somewhat stronger, resembles the traditional equal pro-
tection "rational basis" test. One may agree that the 
challenged cutoff date is rationally related to the legiti-
mate interest of K ew York in preventing party "raiding." 
But this Court's prior decisions simply do not permit 
such an approach. Rather, they recognize that: 
" ... the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter 
in a free and democratic society. Especially since 
the right to exercise the franchise in a free and un-
impaired manner is preservative of other basic civil 
and political rights, any alleged infringement of the 
right of citizens to vote must be carefully and 
Ineticulously scrutinized." Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 
at 561-562. 
Sec also Yick TVo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886). 
Voting in a party primary is as protected against state 
encroachment as voting in a general election. Bullock 
Y. Carter, supra; Terry \'. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953); 
United States v. Classic, 313 r. S. 299 (1941). And the 
Court has E"-aid quite explicitly that "if a challenged stat-
ute grants the right to vote to some citizens and denies tlle 
franchise to others. 'the Court must determine whether 
the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling 
state interest.'" Dunn , .. Blumstein, supra, at 337 
(1972), quoting Kramer v. Union Free School District, 
supra, at G27. Sec al~o Cipn'ano Y. City of Houma, supra, 
at 704 (1969); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, supra, 
at 205, 209 (1970). Like\vise, the Court has asserted 
that "the right of individuals to associate for the ad-
vancement of political beliefs" is "among our most 
precious freedoms," Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S., supm, 
30-31 ( 1968). and must be carefully protected fron1 state 
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encroachment. 1YAA CP Y. Alabama, supra, at 449 
(1958); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); Gib-
son v. Florida Legislative Investigations Committee, 372 
U. R. 539 ( 1963). 
The inquiry thus becomes \vhether the instant statute, 
burdening as it docs fundamental political rights, is nec-
essary to advance a compelling state interest. The as-
serted state interest in this case is the prevention of party 
"raiding." which consists of the movement or "cross-over" 
by members of one party into another's primary to 
"defeat a candidate who is adverse to the interests they 
care to advance."" The typical example is a member 
of one party deliberately entering another's primary to 
help nominate a weaker candidate, so that his O\vn party's 
nominee might win more easily in the general election. 
A tate docs have an interest in preventing such be-
havior, lest "the efficacy of the party system in the 
democratic process-its usefulness in providing a unity 
of divergent factions in an alliance for power-be seri-
ously impaired,'' Rosario v. Rockefeller, - F. 2d -
(CA2). The court below held flatly that the state in-
terest in deterring "raiding" was a "compelling" one. 
!d., at-. 
The matter, however, is not so easily resolved. The 
compelling nature of any such interest cannot be deter-
mined in a vacuum, but rather in the context of the 
means advanced by the State to protect it and the con-
stitutionally sensitive activity it operates to impede. 
The state interest here is hardly compelling enough to 
sustain the presumption, upon >vhich the statute appears _ 
to be based, that .aJ{j)ersons wfio change or declare party 
affiliation nearer than eight to 11 months to a party 
primary do so with intent to raid that primary. Any 
such presumption assumes a willingness to manipulate 
the system which is not likely to be widespread. 
1 ' Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 29. 
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Political parties in this country traditionally have been 
characterized by a fluidity and overlap of philosophy and 
membership. And citizens generally declare or alter 
party affiliation for reasons quite unconnected with any 
premeditated intention to disrupt or frustrate the plans 
of a party with which they are not in sympathy. Citi-
zens customarily choose a party and vote in its primary 
simply because it presents candidates and issues more 
responsive to their immediate concerns and aspirations. 
Such candidates or issues often are not lil.i;,pa+~ eight to 
11 months before a primary. That a citizen s ould be 
absolutely precluded so far in advance from voting in a 
party primary in response to a sympathetic candidate, 
a new or meaningful issue, or changing party philosophies 
in his State, runs contrary to the basic rights of personal 
choice and expression which voting in this country was 
designed to serve. 
Whatever state interest exists for preventing cross-
overs from one party to another is appreciably lessened 
where, as in the case of petitioners, there has been no 
previous affiliation with any political party. The danger 
of voters in sympathy with one party "raiding" another 
party is insubstantial where the voter has made no prior 
party commitment at all. Certainly, the danger falls 
short of the compelling state interest needed to justify 
denying petitioners, so far in advance, the right to declare 
an initial party affiliation and vote in the party primary 
of their choice. 
III 
In Dunn, supra, at 343, the Court emphasized that the 
State, in pursuing its legitimate interest, 
"cannot choose means which unnecessarily burden or 
restrict constitutionally protected activity. Statutes 
affecting constitutional rights must be drawn with 
'precision' NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 419, 438 
71-1371-DISSENT 
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(1963); United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 265 
( 1967), and must be 'tailored' to serve their legiti-
mate objectives. Shapiro v. 'Thompson, supra, 394 
U. S., at 631. And if there are other, reasonable 
ways to achieve these goals with a lessser burden on 
constitutionally protected activity, a State may not 
choose the way of greater interference. If it acts at 
all, it must choose 'less drastic means.' " Shelton 
v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488 (1960). 
The Court states that placing the enrollment deadline 
before the preceding general election serves well the 
state interest in discouraging party "raiding."12 This 
fails to address the critical question of whether that inter-
est may be protected adequately by less severe measures. 
A foreshortening of the challenged period in this case 
would not leave the party structure of New York helpless 
and vulnerable to "raiding" activities. Other States, with 
varied and complex party systems, have maintained them 
successfully without the advanced enrollment deadline 
imposed by New York. 
Political activities do not constantly engage the atten-
tion of Americans. Many citizens do not even vote: 
far fewer subtly calculate to enter another party's pri-
mary to affect adversely that party's interest, especially 
in a day when party labels and loyalties generally are 
said to hold less sway over voters. To the extent that 
"raiding" does occur, it is o ten a last-min~u~t~e;iji~m~- ~=.-j~...,.IC:II""fG::p!!l:~~ 
pulsive phenomenon. It is ~ unlikely that a1 mg 
deadline to one or wo mon 
in advance of a primary. Organizing "raiding" activity 
before such a deadline in the face of voter inertia still 
would be a difficult task. Though a shortened enroll-
ment deadline may not screen out every "raider" that 
'"Court opinion, p. 9. 
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the present deadline does, "raiding" would remain a man-
ageable problem and political parties would maintain 
their distinctive character. What is most important, a 
"less drastic" enrollment deadline would make the fran-· 
chise and opportunities for legitimate party participation 
available to those who constitutionally have the right to. 
exercise them.13 
13 Petitioners also suggest other "less drastic" means of protecting 
the State's interest: greater reliance on the summary disenrollment 
procedures of § 332 of the State's election law and loyalty oaths, 
restrictive party affiliation rules optional for those parties who wish 
them, limitation of the statute's operation to persons with pre-
existing party affiliations, and criminal sanctions for fraudulent par-
ticipation in the electoral process. Tr. of Oral Arg., pp. 13-21. I 
make no judgment either on the efficacy of these alternatives in 
protecting the State's interest or on their potential infringement of 
con~titutionally protected rights. Their presence, however, points 
to the range and variety of other experimental technique:; available 
for New York to comider. 
3rd DRAFT 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting. 
I 
It is important at the outset to place New York's cut-
off date for party enrollment in perspective. It prevents 
prospective voters from registering for a party primary 
some eight months before a presidential primary and 11 
months before a nonpresidential one.1 The Court rec-
ognizes, as it must, that the period between the enroll-
ment and the primary election is a "lengthy" one.2 In-
deed, no other State has imposed upon voters previously 
unaffiliated with any party restrictions which even ap-
proach in severity those of New York.3 And New York 
1 October 2, 1971, was the ln ~t clay on which petitioners' enrollment 
could haYe brrn effective. June 20, 1972, was the date of New York's 
prPSidential primary. Thus the deadline wns actunlly somr eio-ht 
and one-half months before the primary. In nonpreRi.drntinl yr~rs, 
the cutoff runs from early October until the following Srptcmbcr. 
2 Court opinion, p. 8. 
3 The State docs not dispute this point. Src Tr. of Oral A rg. , p. 34. 
Massachusetts, Illinois, Ohio, New ,Terscy, and Texas permit pre-
Yiously unaffiliated voters to declare their initial part~· affiliation 
immediately prior to voting in the primary of their choice. See 
Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, c. 53,§§ 37, 38; Illinois Annotated 
Statutes, §§ 5-30; 7-43- 7-45; New Jersry Statutrs Annotatrd, 
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concedes that only one other State-Kentucky-has im-
posed as stringent a primary registration deadline on 
persons with prior party affiliations.4 Confronted with 
such a facially burden!':ome requirement. I find the Court's 
opinion unconvincing. 
The right of all persons to vote, once the State has 
decided to make it available to some, becomes a basic 
one under the Constitution. Dunn v. Blums.tein, 405 
U. S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School Dislrict, 
395 U. S. 621 (1969); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89 
(1965). Self-expression through the public ballot equally 
with one's peers is the essence of a democratic society. 
Reynolds v. S·ims, 377 r. R. 533 (1964). A citizen with-
out a vote is to a large extent one \\'ithout a voice in 
decisions \Yhich may profoundly affect him and his family. 
Whatever his disagreement may be \Yith the judgments 
of public officials. the citizen should never be given just 
cause to think that he was denied an equal right to· 
elect them. 
Yet the Court today upholds a statute 1\'hich imposes 
substantial and unnecessary restrictions on this right, 
as well as on the closely related right to associate with 
the party of one's choice. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 
U. S. 23 (1968); NAACP "· Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 
10:2:)-4.5; Vernon',.; Annotated Texas Statute,, Tit. 0, i\rt. n.Ol:t; 
Ohio Revised Code, § :351:3.19. 
California. and Prnn,.;~·Jynnin prrmit l1l'C'\' iou"l~· unnffilintrd Yot\'n.; 
to clrdarc an initial p:1rt~· prrfc•rrnrr np to thr do"r of rrgi~tration 
immrcli:ttely prr<"C'ding thr primar~·. Cali fomin Elrction Cod<•, §§ 22, 
2m, :311-312 (rrgi~trntion do"r~ in C:difornia 5::1 cln~·" lwfnrr a 
primar~· ); Purdon':,; Prnn,~·IY:Illia Statntr" Annotntrd , Til. 2.'), §§ 201 
l't seq. (rrgi,;trntion rlo~es in Penn~~·ln1nia 50 d:1~·~ bdorr a 
primnry) . 
\firhigan prrmits an~' rrg;i~trrrd Yotrr to partiripatr in thr pri-
rn:n·~· of his choicr. ?llirhig;an Compiled Law" :\nnotatrcl, §~ 16S.510, 
1G8.1'i75-158.575. Srr Prtit ionN~' Brirf, pp. 3:2-33. 
" Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 34. 
71-1371-DISSENT 
ROSARIO v. ROCKEFELL.ER 3 
(1958); United Slates Y. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967). 
The Court justifies this holding by placing the responsi-
bility upon petitioners for their failure to enroll, as 
required by New York law, eight months prior to the 
presidential primary. We are told that petitioners 
"clearly could have registered and enrolled in the party 
of their choice" before the cutoff date and been eligible 
to vote in the primary, but for undetermined reasons 
"chose not to," and that their disenfranchisement re-
sulted from "their own failure to take timely steps to 
effect their enrollment." 5 
If the cutoff date were a less severe one, I could agree. 
Certainly. the State is justified in imposing a reasonable 
registration cutoff prior to any primary or general elec-
tion, beyond ·which a citizen's failure to register may be 
presumed a negligent or wilful act forfeiting his right 
to vote in a particular election. But it is difficult to 
perceive any persuasive basis for a registration or party 
enrollment deadline eight to 11 months prior to election. 
Failure to comply with such an extreme deadline can 
hardly be used to justify denial of a basic constitutional 
right. Numerous prior decisions impose on us the obli-
gation to protect the continuing availability of the fran-
chise for all citizens, not to sanction its prolonged de-
ferment or deprivation. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 
37 (1879); Ni.&on v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Lane 
v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
189 (1962); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368 (1963); 
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v. 
Sims, supra; Carrington v. Rash, supra; Harper v. Vir-
ginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1966); Kramer 
v. Union Free School District, supra; Cipriano v. City 
5 Court. opinion, pp. 5, 6. See nlcio p. 10 where the Court refers 
to § 186 as mrrel.1· imposing "a lrgitimatr t imr limitation on their 
[petitioners'l enrollment, which they cho~c to di~rrgarcl." 
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of Houma, 395 U. S. 701 (1969); Evans v. Cornman, 393· 
U. S. 419 (1970); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 
U.S. 204 (1970); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); 
Dunn v. Blumstein, supra. 
The majority excuses the challenged statute because 
it does not "absolutely" disenfranchise petitioners or im-
pose any absolute ban on their freedom of association.6 
The State likewise contends this is "not a disenfranchis-
ing statute." 7 The Court apparently views this stat-
n Sre the Court's opinion, at p. 5: 
"Section 186 of New York's Election Law, however, i8 quite different .. 
H did not absolutely disenfmnchisc the clas::; to which the petitioners 
brlong-newly rrgi::;tered voters who were eligible to enroll in a 
party before the previous general election. Rather, the statutes· 
merely imposed a time dcndlinc on their enrollment, which thry had 
to meet in order to pnrticipatc in the next primary." 
Similarly at p. 6: 
"The prtitionrrs do not say why they did not rnroll prior to the-
cutoff elate, but it is clrar that the? could have clone so, but chose 
not to. Hence, if their plight can be characterized aR disenfranchise-
mrnt at nil, it was not rausrd by § 186, but by their own failure to 
take timely steps to effect their enrollment. 
"For the same reason, we rrjcct the petitioners' argumrnt that § 186 
viola ted their First and Fourthtcenth Amendment right of free asso-
ciation with the political party of their choice. Since they could 
have enrolled in a party in time to participate in the June 1972 
primary, § 186 did not constitute a ban on their frerdom of associa-
tion, but merely a time limitation on when they had to act in order 
to participate in their chosen party's next primary." 
And p. 10: 
"New York did not prohibit the petitioners from voting in the 1972 
primary election or from associating with the political party of their 
choice. It merely imposed a legitimate time limitation on their 
enrollment, which they chose to disregard." 
In nll these instnnccs, the majority seeks to distinguish a "time lim-
itation" from an ab::;olutc disenfranchiscment of petitioners or an 
nbsolute ban on their as~ociational rights. 
7 Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 35. 
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ute as postponing rather than denying altogether peti-
tioners' voting and associational rights.8 I cannot agree. 
Deferment of a right, especially one as sensitive and 
essential as the exercise of the first duty of citizenship,. 
can be tantamount to its denial. And any statute which 
imposes for eight or 11 months an absolute freeze on 
party enrollment and the consequent right to vote does 
disenfranchise those who, for quite legitimate reasons, 
decide to register closer than eight months to the primary 
date and those who, for equally legitimate reasons, wish 
to choose or alter party affiliation. Our decisions, how-
ever, have never required a permanent ban on the exercise 
of voting and associational rights before a constitutional 
breach is incurred. Rather, they have uniformly recog-
nized that a serious burden or infringement on such 
"constitutionally protected activity" is sufficient to estab-· 
lish a constitutional violation , Dunn v. Blumstein, supra,. 
at 343; NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 419, 438 ( 1963); 
Reynolds v. Sims, supra, at 561-562. 
II 
The majority does not identify the standard of scru-
tiny it applies to the New York statute. We are told 
only that the cutoff date is "not an arbitrary time limit 
unconnected to any important state goal"; 9 that it is 
"tied to a particularized legitimate purpose and is in no 
sense invidious or arbitrary." 1 0 The Court does not 
explain why this formulation was chosen, what precedents 
support it, or how and in what contexts it is to be ap-
plied. Such nebulous promulgations are bound to leave 
the lower courts and state legislatures in doubt and con-
fusion as to how we will approach future significant bur-· 
8 Court opinion, p. 7. 
n Court opinion, p . 8. 
1U !d., p. 9. 
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dens on the right to vote and to associate freely with the 
party of one's choice. 
The Court's formulation, though the terminology is 
somewhat stronger, resembles the traditional equal pro-
tection "rational basis" test. One may agree that the 
challenged cutoff date is rationally related to the legiti-
mate interest of Nevv York in preventing party "raiding." 
But this Court's prior decisions simply do not permit 
such an approach. Rather, they recognize that: 
" ... the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter 
in a free and democratic society. Especially since 
the right to exercise the franchise in a free and un-
impaired manner is preservative of other basic civil 
and political rights. any alleged infringement of the 
right of citizens to vote must be carefully and 
meticulously scrutinized." Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 
at 561-562. 
Sec also Yick Tro Y. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886). 
Voting in a party primary is as protected against state 
encroachment as voting in a general election. Bullock 
Y. Carter, supra; Terry\'. Ada111s, 345 U. S. 461 (Hl53); 
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 290 (1941). And the 
Court has said quite explicitly that "if a challenged stat-
ute grants the right to vote to some citizrns and denies the 
franchise to others, 'the Court must determine whether 
the exclusions arc necessary to promote a compelling 
state interest.' " Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, at 337 
(1972), quoting Kramer "· Uuion Free School D·istrict, 
supra, at 627. See also Cipriano v. City of Houma, supm, 
at 704 (1969); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, sttpra, 
at 205, 209 (1970). Likewise. the Court has asserted 
that "the right of individuals to associate for the ad-
vancement of political beliefs" is "among our most 
precious freedoms," Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S .. supra, 
30-31 (1968), anrl must be carefully protected from state 
encroachment. NAACP v. Alabama, supm, at 449 
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(1958); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516 (1960); Gib-
son v. Florida Legislative Investigations Committee, 372 
U. S. 539 (1963). 
The inquiry thus becomes whether the instant statute, 
burdening as it does fundamental political rights, is nec-
essary to advance a compelling state interest. The as-
serted state interest in this case is the prevention of party 
"raiding," which consists of the movement or "cross-over" 
by members of one party into another's primary to 
"defeat a candidate who is adverse to the interests they 
care to advance." n The typical example is a member 
of one party deliberately entering another's primary to 
help no.minate a weaker candidate, so that his own party's 
nominee might win more easily in the general election. 
A State does have an interest in preventing such be-
havior, lest "the efficacy of the party system in the 
democratic process-its usefulness in providing a unity 
of divergent factions in an alliance for power-be seri-
ously impaired." Rosario Y. Rockefeller, - F. 2d -
(CA2). The court below held flatly that the state in-
terest in deterring "raiding" was a "compelling" one. 
Id., at-. 
The rnatter, however, is not so easily resolved. The 
compelling nature of any such interest cannot be deter-
mined in a vacuum, but rather in the context of the 
means advanced by the State to protect it and the con-
stitutionally sensitive activity it operates to impede. 
The state interest here is hardly compelling enough to 
sustain the presumption, upon which the statute appears 
to be based, that all persons who change or declare party 
affiliation nearer than eight to 11 months to a party 
primary do so with intent to raid that primary. Any 
such presumption assumes a willingness to manipulate 
the system 'shich is not likely to be widespread. 
11 Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 29. 
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Political parties in this country traditionally have been 
characterized by a fluidity a.nd overlap of philosophy and 
membership. And citizens generally declare or alter 
party affiliation for reasons quite unconnected with any 
premeditated intention to disrupt or frustrate the plans 
of a party with which they are not in sympathy. Citi-
zens customarily choose a party and vote in its primary 
simply because it presents candidates and issues more 
responsive to their immediate concerns and aspirations. 
Such candidates or issues often are not apparent eight to 
11 months before a primary. That a citizen should be 
absolutely precluded so far in advance from voting in a 
party primary in response to a sympathetic candidate, 
a new or meaningful issue, or changing party philosophies 
in his State, runs contrary to the basic rights of personal 
choice and expression which voting in this country was 
designed to serve. 
Whatever state interest exists for preventing cross-
overs from one party to another is appreciably lessened 
where, as in the case of petitioners, there has been no 
previous affiliation with any political party. The danger 
of voters in sympathy with one party "raiding" another 
party is insubstantial where the voter has made no prior 
party commitment at all. Certainly, the danger falls 
short of the compelling state interest needed to justify 
denying petitioners, so far in advance, the right to declare 
an initial party affiliation and vote in the party primary 
of their choice. 
III 
In Dunn, supra, at 343, the Court emphasized that the 
State, in pursuing its legitimate interest, 
"cannot choose means which unnecessarily burden or 
restrict constitutionally protected activity. Statutes 
affecting constitutional rights must be drawn with 
'precision' NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 419, 438 
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(1963); Unite.d States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 265 
( 1967), and must be 'tailored' to serve their legiti-
mate objectives. Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, 394 
U. S., at 631. And if there are other, reasonable 
ways to achieve these goals with a lessser burden on 
constitutionally protected activity, a State may not 
choose the way of greater interference. If it acts at 
all, it must choose 'less drastic means.' " Shelton 
v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488 (1960). 
The Court states that placing the enrollment deadline 
before the preceding general election serves well the 
state interest in discouraging party "raiding."12 This 
fails to address the critical question of whether that inter-
est may be protected adequately by less severe measures. 
A foreshortening of the challenged period in this case 
would not leave the party structure of New York helpless 
and vulnerable to "raiding" activities. Other States, with 
varied and complex party systems, have maintained them 
successfully without the advanced enrollment deadline 
imposed by New York. 
Political activities do not constantly engage the atten-
tion of Americans. Many citizens do not even vote: 
far fewer subtly calculate to enter another party's pri-
mary to affect adversely that party's interest, especially 
in a day when party labels and loyalties generally are 
said to hold less sway over voters. To the extent that 
"raiding" does occur, it is most often a last-minute im-
pulsive phenomenon. It is quite unlikely that raiding 
would occur with any frequency, were New York to· 
reduce its enrollment deadline to one or two months 
in advance of a primary. Organizing "raiding" activity 
before such a deadline in the face of voter inertia still 
would be a difficult task. Though a shortened enroll-
ment deadline may not screen out every "raider" that 
1 ~ Court opinjon, p. 9. 
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the present deadline does, "raiding" would remain a man-
ageable problem and political parties would maintain 
their distinctive chara.cter. What is most important, a 
"less drastic" enrollment deadline would make the fran-
chise and opportunities for legitimate party participation 
available to those who constitutionally have the right to 
exercise them.13 
13 Petitioners also suggest other "less drastic" means of protecting 
the State's interest: greater rrlianre on the summar~· disenrollmrnt 
procedures of § 332 of the State's election law and loyalt~· oaths, 
restricti1·e party afftliation rules optional for tho~e parties who wish 
them, limitation of the statute's operation to persons with pre-
existing party affiliations, and criminal sanctions for fraudulent par-
ticipation in the electoral process. Tr. of Oral Arg., pp. 13-21. I 
make no judgment either on the efficacy of these alternatives in 
protecting the State's interest or on their potential infringrment of 
con~Litutionally protected rights. Their presence, howen~r, points 
to the range and variety of other experimental techniques a1·ailable 
for New York to consider. 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JusTICE DouG-
LAS, MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, and MR. JusTICE MARSHALL 
join, dissenting. 
I 
It is important at the outset to place New Y ark's cut-
off date for party enrollment in perspective. It prevents 
prospective voters from registering for a party primary 
some eight months before a presidential primary and 11 
months before a nonpresidential one.1 The Court rec-
ognizes, as it must, that the period between the enroll-
ment and the primary election is a "lengthy" oue.2 In-
deed, no other State has imposed upon voters previously 
unaffiliated with any party restrictions which even ap-
proach in severity those of New York.3 And New York 
1 October 2, 1971, was the last day on which petitioners' enrollment 
could have been effective. June 20, 1972, was the date of New York'::; 
presidential primary. Thus the deadline was actually some eight 
and one-half months before the primary. In nonpresidential years, 
the cutoff runs from early October until the following September. 
2 Court opinion, p. 8. 
3 The State docs not dispute this point. Sec Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 34. 
Massachusetts, Illinois, Ohio, New Jersry, and Texas permit pre-
viously unaffiliated voters to declare their initial party affiliation 
immediately prior to voting in the primary of their choice. See 
Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, c. 53,§§ 37, 38; Illinois Annotated 
Statutes, §§ 5-30; 7-43-7-45; New Jersey Statutes Annotated, 
) 
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I 
It is important at the outset to place New York's cut-
off date for party enrollment in perspective. It prevents 
prospective voters from registering for a party primary 
some eight months before a presidential primary and 11 
months before a nonpresidential one.1 The Court rec-
ognizes, as it must, that the period between the enroll-
ment and the primary election is a "lengthy" one. 2 In-
deed, no other State has imposed upon voters previously 
unaffiliated with any party restrictions which even ap-
proach in severity those of New York.3 And New York 
1 October 2, 1971, was the last day on which petitioners' enrollment 
could have been effective. June 20, 1972, was the date of New York':; 
presidential primary. Thus the deadline was actually some eight 
and one-half months before the primary. In nonprcsidential years, 
the cutoff runs from early October until the following September. 
2 Court opinion, p. 8. 
3 The State docs not dispute this point. Sec Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 34. 
Massachusetts, Illinois, Ohio, New Jersey, and Texas permit pre-
viously unaffiliated voters to declare their initial party affiliation 
immediately prior to voting in the primary of their choice. See 
Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, c. 53,§§ 37, 38; Illinois Annotated 
Statutes, §§ 5-30; 7-43 -7-45; New Jersey Statutes Annotated, 
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concedes that only one other State-Kentucky-has im-
posed as stringent a primary registration deadline on 
persons with prior party affiliations.' Confronted with 
such a facially burdensome requirement, I find the Court's 
opmwn unconvmcmg. 
The right of all persons to vote, once the State has 
decided to make it available to some, becomes a basic 
one under the Constitution. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 
U. S. 330 (Hl72); Kramer\'. Union Free School District, 
395 U. S. 621 (1969); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89 
(1965). Self-expression through the public ballot equally 
with one's peers is the essence of a democratic society. 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). A citizen with-
out a vote is to a large extent one without a voice in 
decisions which may profoundly affect him and his family. 
Whatever his disagreement may be with the judgments 
of public officials, the citizen should never be given just 
cause to think that he was denied an equal right to 
elect them. 
Yet the Court today upholds a statute ·which imposes 
substantial and unnecessary restrictions on this right, 
as well as on the closely related right to associate with 
the party of one's choice. See Willimns v. Rhodes, 393 
U. S. 23 (1968); KAACP Y. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 
19:2:3-45; Vernon'~ Annotatrd Tcxa~ Statute~. Tit. 9, Art. 1:3.0la; 
Ohio Rcvicird Code, § 3513.19. 
California. and Prnn~ylvania permit pre\'iou~I~- unafliliatrcl voter~ 
to declare an initial part~· prrfrrenrr up to thr close of rrp;io;tration 
immecliatrly prrrrding the primar~·. Califomia Election Code, §§ 22, 
:20:3, 311-312 (rrp;i~tration closes in California 5:3 clay~ brfore a 
primary); Purdon '~ Penns.l'lvania Statutes Annota1rd, Tit. 2.5, §§ 291 
et seq. (rep;istral ion elo::<e~ in Penns~·lvania 50 da~-~ brforr a 
prima r~· ). 
::\Iichig;a11 permit~ an~· reg;istcrrd voter to participate in thr pri-
nulr~· of his rhoirr. I\Iiehig;an Compilrd Law~ Annotated,§§ 16i-i . .570, 
J6R.575-168.576. See Petitionrr"' Brief, Jlp. 32-33. 
'Tr. of Oral Arg., p. :1-1-. 
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(1958); United Stales Y. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967). 
The Court justifies this holding by placing the responsi-
bility upon petitioners for their failure to enroll, as 
required by 1'\ ew York law, eight months prior to the 
presidential primary. \Ve are told that petitioners 
"clearly could have registered and enrolled in the party 
of their choice" before the cutoff date and been eligible 
to vote in the primary, but for undetermined reasons 
"chose not to," and that their disenfranchisement re-
sulted from "their own failure to take timely steps to 
effect their enrollment."" 
If the cutoff elate were a Jess severe one, I could agree. 
Certainly, the State is justified in imposing a reasonable 
registration cutoff prior to any primary or general elec-
tion, beyond which a citizen's failure to register may be 
presumed a negligent or wilful act forfeiting his right 
to vote in a particular election. But it is difficult to 
perceive any persuasive basis for a registration or party 
enrollment deadline eight to 11 months prior to election. 
Failure to comply \Yith such an extreme deadline can 
hardly be used to justify denial of a basic constitutional 
right. Numerous prior decisions impose on us the obli-
gation to protect the continuing availability of the fran-
chise for all citizens. not to sanction its prolonged de-
ferment or deprivation. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 
37 (1879); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Lane 
v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
189 (1962); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368 (1963); 
TV esberry Y. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v .. 
Sims, supra; Carrington v. Rash, supra; Harper v. Vir-
ginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1966); Kramer 
v. Union Free School District, supra; Cipriano v. City 
r. Court opinion, pp. 5, G. Srr al~o Jl. 10 where the Court rrfen:; 
io § lHG a~ merdy imposinp; "a lep;itimatc timr limitation on ihrir 
rrJCtitioner:s' 1 emollmrnt, which they chose to cli::lrrgnrcl." 
71-1371-DISSENT 
4 ROSARIO v. ROCKEFELLER 
of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Evans v. Cornman, 398 
U. S. 419 (1970); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 
U.S. 204 (1970); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); 
D1mn v. Blumstein, supra. 
The majority excuses the challenged statute because 
it does not "absolutely" disenfranchise petitioners or im-
pose any absolute ban on their freedom of association. 6 
The State likewise contends this is "not a disenfranchis-
ing statute." 7 The Court apparently views this stat-
n Sec the Conrt'H opinion, at p. 5: 
"Section 186 of New York'~ Election Law, however, iH quite differenL 
It did not absolutdy di~enfranchise the class to which the pC'titioners 
belong-newly registered voters who were eligible 1 o enroll in a 
party before the previous general election. Rather, the statute~ 
merdy imposed a time deadline on their enrollment, which they had 
to meet in order to participate in the next primary." 
Similarl:1' at p. 6: 
"The petitioners do not say wh~r they did not C'nroll prior to the 
cutoff dare, but it is clear that they could have done so, but chose 
not to. Hence, if their plight can be characterized as disenfranchise-
ment at all, it was not caused by § 186, but by their own failure to 
take timely steps to effect their enrollment. 
"For the same reason, we reject the petitioners' argument that § 186 
violated their First and Fourthtecnth Amendment right of free asso-
ciation with the political party of their choice. Since they could 
have enrolled in a party in time to participate in the June 1972 
primary, § 186 did not constitute a ban on their freedom of associa-
tion, but merely a time limitation on when they had to act in order 
to participate in their chosen party's next primary." 
And p. 10: 
"New Y ark did not prohibit the petitioners from voting in the 1972 
primary election or from associating with the political party of their 
choice. It merely imposed a legitimate time limitation on their 
enrollment, which they chose to disregard." 
In all these instances, the majority seeks to distinguish a "time lim-
itation" from an absolute disenfranchisement of petitioners or an 
absolute ban on their associational rights. 
7 Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 35. 
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ute as postponing rather than denying altogether peti-
tioners' voting and associational rights.8 I cannot agree. 
Deferment of a right, especially one as sensitive and 
essential as the exercise of the first duty of citizenship, 
can be tantamount to its denial. And any statute which 
imposes for eight or 11 months an absolute freeze on 
party enrollment and the consequent right to vote does 
disenfranchise those who, for quite legitimate reasons, 
decide to register closer than eight months to the primary 
date and those who, for equally legitimate reasons, wish 
to choose or alter party affiliation. Our decisions, how-
ever, have never required a permanent ban on the exercise 
of voting and associational rights before a constitutional 
breach is incurred. Rather, they have uniformly recog-
nized that any serious burden or infringement on such 
"constitutionally protected activity" is sufficient to estab-
lish a constitutional violation, Dunn v. Blumstein, supra,. 
at 343; NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 419, 438 (1963); 
Reynolds v. Sims, supra, at 561-562. 
II 
The majority does not identify the standard of scru-
tiny it applies to the New York statute. We are told 
only that the cutoff date is "not an arbitrary time limit 
unconnected to any important state goal"; 0 that it is 
"tied to a particularized legitimate purpose and is in no 
sense invidious or arbitrary." 10 The Court does not 
explain why this formulation was chosen, what precedents 
support it, or how and in what contexts it is to be ap-
plied. Such nebulous promulgations are bound to leave 
the lower courts and state legislatures in doubt and con-
fusion as to how we will approach future significant bur-
s Court opinion, p. 7. 
° Court opinion, p. 8. 
10 !d., p. 9. 
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dens on the right to vote and to associate freely with the 
party of one's choice. 
The Court's formulatiou, though the terminology is 
somewhat stronger. re:;:cmblcs the traditional equal pro-
tection "rational basis" test. One may agree that the 
challenged cutoff date is rationally related to the legiti-
mate interest of Kcw York in preventing party "raiding." 
But this Court's prior decisions simply do not permit 
such an approach. Rather, they recognize that: 
" ... the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter 
in a free and democratic society. Especially since 
the right to exercise the franchjsc in a free and un-
impaired manner is preservative of other basic civil 
and political rights, any alleged infringement of the 
right of citizens to vote must be carefully and 
meticulously scrutinized." Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 
at 561-562. 
Sec also Yick Tl'o v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886). 
Voting in a party primary is as protected against state 
encroachment as voting in a general election. Bullock 
Y. Carter, supra; Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953); 
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). And the 
Court has said quite explicitly that "if a challenged stat-
ute grants the right to vote to some citizens and denies the 
franchise to others, 'the Court must determine whether 
the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling 
state interest.' " Dunn Y. Blumstein, supra, at 337 
(1972), quoting Kramer Y. Union Fr·ee School District,. 
supra, at 627. See also Cipriano v. City of Houma, supra, 
at 704 (1960); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, supra, 
at 205, 209 (1070). Likewise, the Court has asserted 
that "the right of individuals to associate for the ad-
vancement of political beliefs" is "among our most 
precious freedoms," Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S., supra, 
30-31 (1968), and must be carefully protected from state 
encroachment. NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 441} 
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(1958); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516 (1960); Gib-
son v. Florida Legislative Investigations Committee, 372 
U. S. 539 (1963). 
The inquiry thus becomes '"hethcr the instant statute, 
burdening as it does fundamental political rights, is nec-
essary to advance a compelling state interest. The as-
serted state interest in this case is the prevention of party 
"raiding." which consists of the movement or "cross-over" 
by members of one party into another's primary to 
"defeat a candidate who is adverse to the interests they 
care to advance." 11 The typical example is a member 
of one party deliberately entering another's primary to 
help nominate a weaker candidate, so that his own party's 
nominee might win more easily in the general election. 
A State docs have an interest in preventing such be-
havior, lest "the efficacy of the party system in the 
democratic process-its usefulness in providing a unity 
of divergent factions in an alliance for power-be seri-
ously impaired." Rosario v. Rockefeller, - F. 2cl -
(CA2). The court below held flatly that the state in-
terest in deterring "raiding" was a "compelling" one. 
Id., at-. 
The matter, however, is not so easily resolved. The 
compelling nature of any such interest cannot be deter-
mined in a vacuum, but rather in the context of the 
means advanced by the State to protect it and the con-
stitutionally sensitive activity it operates to impede. 
The state interest here is hardly compelling enough to 
sustain the presumption, upon which the statute appears 
to be based, that all persons who change or declare party 
affiliation nearer than eight to 11 months to a party 
primary do so with intent to raid that primary. Any 
such presumption assumes a willingness to manipulate 
the system which is not likely to be widespread. 
11 Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 29. 
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Political parties in this country traditionally have been 
characterized by a fluidity and overlap of philosophy and 
membership. And citizens generally declare or alter 
party affiliation for reasons quite unconnected with any 
premeditated intention to disrupt or frustrate the plans 
of a party with which they are not in sympathy. Citi-
zens customarily choose a party and vote in its primary 
simply because it presents candidates and issues more 
responsive to their immediate concerns and aspirations. 
Such candidates or issues often are not apparent eight to 
11 months before a primary. That a citizen should be 
absolutely precluded so far in advance from voting in a 
party primary in response to a sympathetic candidate, 
a new or meaningful issue, or changing party philosophies 
in his State, runs contrary to the basic rights of personal 
choice and expression which voting in this country was 
designed to serve. 
Whatever state interest exists for preventing cross-
overs from one party to another is appreciably lessened 
where, as in the case of petitioners, there has been no 
previous affiliation with any political party. The danger 
of voters in sympathy with one party "raiding" another 
party is insubstantial where the voter has made no prior 
party commitment at all. Certainly, the danger falls 
short of the compelling state interest needed to justify 
denying petitioners, so far in advance, the right to declare 
an initial party affiliation and vote in the party primary 
of their choice. 
III 
In Dunn, supra, at 343, the Court emphasized that the 
State, in pursuing its legitimate interest, 
"cannot choose means which unnecessarily burden or 
restrict constitutionally protected activity. Statutes 
affecting constitutional rights must be drawn with 
'precision' NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 419, 438 
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(1963); United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 265 
( 1967), and must be 'tailored' to serve their legiti-
mate objectives. Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, 394 
U. S., at 631. And if there are other, reasonable 
ways to achieve these goals with a lessser burden on 
constitutionally protected activity, a State may not 
choose the way of greater interference. If it acts at 
all, it must choose 'less drastic means.' " Shelton 
v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488 (1960). 
The Court states that placing the enrollment deadline 
before the preceding general election serves well the 
state interest in discouraging party "raiding."u This. 
fails to address the critical question of whether that inter-
est may be protected adequately by less severe measures. 
A foreshortening of the challenged period in this case· 
would not leave the party structure of New York helpless 
and vulnerable to "raiding" activities. Other States, with 
varied and complex party systems, have maintained them 
successfully without the advanced enrollment deadline· 
imposed by New York. 
Partisan political activities do not constantly engage 
the attention of large numbers of Americans, especially 
as party labels and loyalties tend to be less persuasive 
than issues and the qualities of individual candidates. 
The crossover in registration from one party to another 
is most often impelled by motives quite unrelated to a 
desire to raid or distort a party's primary. To the extent 
that deliberate raiding occurs, it is usually the result of 
organized effort which depends for its success upon some 
relatively immediate concern or interest of the voters. 
This type of effort is more likely to occur as a primary 
date draws near. If .u.ew York were to adopt a more 
reasonable enrollment a eadline, say 30 to 60 days, the 
period most vulnerable to raiding activity would be pro-
1 " Court opinion, p. 9. 
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tected. More importantly, a less drastic enrollment 
deadline than the eight or 11 months now imposed by 
New York would make the franchise and oportunities 
for legitimate party participation available to those who 
constitutionally have the right to exercise them."' 
Ja Petitioners also suggeot other "less drastie" mean~ of protecting 
1he Rtnte's interest: greater rrlianee on the ~ummnr~· dil'enrollnwnt 
prorrdures of § 3a2 of the State's election law and lo~·nlt~· oath~, 
rcstrirtiYe party afiiliation rnlrs optional for thosr partirs who wiHh 
them, limitation of the statute'::; operation to prrsonl' with pre-
existing party affiliations, nnd criminal san.ctiom for fraudulent pnr-
ticipntion in the electoral proce~i:l. Tr. of Ornl Arg., pp. 1:~-21. I 
make no judgment either on the efficacy of these alternatiw~ in 
protrrting the State's intere::;t or on their potential infringenwnt of 
con~titutimwlly protected rights. Their presenrr, howr\·cr·, points 
to the range and variety of other experimental trrhnique~ ::w:1ila ble 
for New York to consider. 
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I 
It is important at the outset to place New York's cut-
off date for party enrollment in perspective. It prevents 
prospective voters from registering for a party primary 
some eight months before a presidential primary and 11 
months before a nonpresidential one.1 The Court rec-
ognizes, as it must, that the period between the enroll-
ment and the primary election is a "lengthy" one.2 In-
deed, no other State has imposed upon voters previously 
unaffiliated with any party restrictions which even ap-
proach in severity those of New York.3 And New York 
1 October 2, 1971, was the last day on whirh petitioners' enrollment 
could have been effective. June 20, 1972, was the date of New York's 
presidential primary. Thus the deadline was actually some eight 
and one-half months before the primary. In nonprc:;idential years, 
the cutoff runs from early October until the following September. 
2 Court opinion, p. 8. 
3 The State does not dispute this point. See Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 34. 
MassachusetM, Illinois, Ohio, New Jersey, and Texas permit pre-
viously unaffiliated voters to declare their initial party affiliation 
immediately prior to voting in the primary of their choice. See 
Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, c. 53,§§ 37, 38; Illinois Annotated 
Statutes, §§ 5-30; 7-43-7-45; New Jersey Statutes Annotated, 
ffB 8 1973 
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concedes that only one other State-Kentucky- has im-
posed as stringent a primary registration deadline on 
persons with prior party affiliations.4 Confronted with 
such a facially burdensome requirement, I find the Court's 
opm10n unconvmcmg. 
The right of all persons to vote, once the State has 
decided to make it available to some, becomes a basic 
one under the Constitution. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 
U. S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 
395 U. S. 621 (1969); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89' 
(1965). Self-expression through the public ballot equally 
with one's peers is the essence of a democratic society. 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). A citizen with-
out a vote is to a large extent one without a voice in 
decisions which may profoundly affect him and his family. 
Whatever his disagreement may be with the judgments 
of public officials. the citizen should never be given just 
cause to think that he was denied an equal right to-
elect them. 
Yet the Court today upholds a statute which imposes 
substantial and unnecessary restrictions on this right, 
as well as on the closely related right to associate with 
the party of one's choice. Sec Williams v. Rhodes, 393 
U. S. 23 (1968); NAACP Y. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449' 
19:23-45; Vernon'~ Annotatrrl Tcxa~ Statute><, Tit. 9, ,\rt. 1>l.01a; 
Ohio Revised Coclr, § 3.513.19. 
California, and Prnn~~'h'a nia perm it JH'CI·iou~l~· unafiil ia trd Yot rr:s 
to declare an initial part!· prrfrrcmr up to t hr rlo~r of rrg;istration 
immrdiately prrrrding thr primar~· . Cnlifomia Elrction CodP, §§ 22, 
203, 311-312 (rrg;i~tratimt do~cs in (';difomia 5:1 cln.''' hdorr a 
primar~·); Purdon's Penn~!·[,·a nia Stntutr~ Annotatrd, Tit. 25. §§ 291 
ct srq. (rrgist ration elo~rs in Pmm;~·[yania 50 cla~·s bdorr a 
primary). 
:\fit·hig;un permits an!' rrg;i;:trrrd 1·ot rr to part ir·ipa lr in t hr pri-
mar.'· of his choicr. Michigan Compiled Laws 1\nnotatrcl , §§ IG~.!i70 ,. 
168.575-168.576. Srr PPt it ionrr;-; ' Brirf, pp. 8:2-:~:). 
" Tr. of Oral Arg;., p. 34. 
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(1058); United States Y. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967). 
The Court justifies this holding by placing the responsi-
bility upon petitioners for their failure to enroll, as 
required by Kew York law, eight months prior to the 
presidential primary. We are told that petitioners 
"clearly could have registered and enrolled in the party 
of their choice'' before the cutoff date and been eligible 
to vote in the primary, but for undetermined reasons 
"chose not to,'' and that their disenfranchisement re-
sulted from "their own failure to take timely steps to 
effect their enrollment."" 
If the cutoff elate were a less severe one, I could agree. 
Certainly, the State is justified in imposing a reasonable 
registration cutoff prior to any primary or general elec-
tion, beyond which a citizen's failure to register may be 
presumed a negligent or wilful act forfeiting his right 
to vote in a particular election. But it is difficult to 
perceive any persuasive basis for a registration or party 
enrollment deadline eight to 11 months prior to election. 
Failure to comply "\Yith such an extreme deadline can 
hardly be used to justify denial of a basic constitutional 
right. Numerous prior decisions impose on us the obli-
gation to protect the continuing availability of the fran-
chise for all citizens, not to sanction its prolonged de-
ferment or deprivation. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 
37 (1879); Nircon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Lane 
Y. ·wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
189 (1962); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368 (Hl63); 
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v. 
Sims, supra; Carrington v. Rash, supra; Harper v. Vir-
ginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1966); Kramer 
v. Union Free School District, supra; Cipriano v. City 
5 Court opinion, pp. 5, G. Scr abo p. 10 wherr the Court rrfrr~ 
to § lSG as merely imposing "a lrgitimatc i imr limitation on their 
[petitioner:;'] enrollment, which thrr chose to di~rrgard." 
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of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Evans v. Cornman, 398 
U. S. 419 (1970); C1"ty of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 
U.S. 204 (1970); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); 
D~mn v. Blumstein, supra. 
The majority excuses the challenged statute because· 
it does not "absolutely" disenfranchise petitioners or im-
pose any absolute ban on their freedom of association.6 
The State likewise contends this is "not a disenfranchis-
ing statute." 7 The Court apparently views this stat-
r. See the Court's opinion, at p. 5: 
"Srction 186 of New York's Elrction Law, howevrr, is qnitr diffrrrnt. 
1t did not absolutrly disrnfr:mchisr thr class to which the prt itioners 
brlong-nrwly registerrd votrrs who wNr eligible to 0nroll in a 
party before the previous grnNal elrction. Rathrr, the st atutrs 
merrly imposed a timr draclline on thrir enrollmrnt, whirh 1!10~· had 
to meet in order to participate in the next primary." 
Similarly at p. 6: 
"Thr petitioners do not say wh~· they did not rnroll prior to the 
rntoff date, but it is rlear that they could have donr so, but chose 
not to. Hence, if their plight ran be characterizrd a~ disenfranchise-
ment at all, it was not rausrd by § 186, but by their own failure to 
take timely steps to effect their enrollmrnt. 
"For the same rea. on, wr rrjrrt the petitioners' argumrnt that § 186 
Yiobted their First and Fourthteenth Amendment right of free asso-
ciation with the political party of their choice. Since they could 
have enrolled in n party in time to participatr in the Jnnr 1972 
primary, § 186 did not constitute a ban on their frrrclom of assoria-
tion, but merely a time limitation on when they had to art in order 
to participate iu their chosen party's next primary." 
And p. 10: 
"New York did not prohibit the petitioners from voting in the 1972 
primary election or from associating with the political party of their 
choire. It merely imposed a legitimate time limitation on their 
enrollment, which they chose to disregard." 
In all these instances, thr majority seeks to distinguish a "time lim-
itation" from an absolute discnfranrhi~rment of petitioners or an 
absolute ban on their associational rights. 
' Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 35. 
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ute as postponing rather than denying altogether peti-
tioners' voting and associational rights.8 I cannot agree. 
Deferment of a right, especially one as sensitive and' 
essential as the exercise of the first duty of citizenship, 
can be tantamount to its denial. And any statute which 
imposes for eight or 11 months an absolute freeze on 
party enrollment and the consequent right to vote does 
disenfranchise those who, for quite legitimate reasons, 
decide to register closer than eight months to the primary 
date and those who, for equally legitimate reasons, wish 
to choose or alter party affiliation. Our decisions, how-
ever, have never required a permanent ban on the exercise· 
of voting and associational rights before a constitutional 
breach is incurred. Rather, they have uniformly recog-
nized that any serious burden or infringement on such 
"constitutionally protected activity" is sufficient to estab-
lish a constitutional violation, Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, 
at 343; NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 419, 438 (1963); 
Reynolds v. Sims, supra, at 561-562. 
II 
The majority does not identify the standard of scru-
tiny it applies to the New· York statute. We are told' 
only that the cutoff date is "not an arbitrary time limit 
unconnected to any important state goal"; 9 that it is 
"tied to a particularized legitimate purpose and is in no 
sense invidious or arbitrary." 10 The Court does not 
explain why this formulation was chosen, what precedents 
support it, or how and in what contexts it is to be ap-
plied. Such nebulous promulgations are bound to leave 
the lower courts and state legislatures in doubt and con-
fusion as to how we will approach future significant bur-
8 Court opinion, p. 7. 
9 Court opinion, p. 8. 
10 I d., p. 9. 
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dens on the right to vote and to associate freely with the 
party of one's choice. 
The Court's form.ulation, though the terminology is 
somewhat stronger, res0.mblcs the traditional equal pro-
tection "rational basis" test. One may agree that the 
challenged cutoff elate is rationally related to the legiti-
mate interest of New York in preventing party "raiding." 
But this Court's prior decisions simply do not permit 
such an approach. Rather, they recognize that: 
" ... the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter 
in a free and democratic society. Especially since 
the right to exercise the franchise in a free and un-
impaired manner is preservative of other basic civil 
and political rights, any alleged infringement of the 
right of citizens to vote must be carefully and 
meticulously scrutinized." Reynolds v. Sirns, supra, 
at 561-562. 
See also Yick TYo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886). 
Voting in a party primary is as protected against state 
encroachment as voting in a general election. Bullock 
v. Carter, supra; 'Perry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953); 
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). And the 
Court has said quite explicitly that "if a challenged stat-
ute grants the right to vote to some citizens and denies the 
franchise to others, 'the Court must determine "·hether 
the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling 
state interest.'" Dunn Y. Blumstein, supra, at 337 
(1972), quoting Kramer v. Union Free School District, 
supra, at 627. See also Cipriano v. City of Houma, supra, 
at 704 (1969); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, supra, 
at 205, 209 (1070). Likewise, the Court has asserted 
that "the right of individuals to associate for the ad-
vancement of political beliefs" is "among our most 
precious freedoms," Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S., supra, 
30-31 (1968), and must be carefully protected from state 
encroachment. NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 449 
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(1958); Rates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516 (1960); Gib-
son v. Florida Legislat·ive Investigations Committee, 372 
u. s. 539 (1963). 
The inquiry thus becomes whether the instant statute, 
burdening as it does fundamental political rights, is nec-
essary to advance a compelling state interest. The as-
serted state interest in this case is the prevention of party 
"raiding." which consists of the movement or "cross-over" 
by members of one party into another's primary to 
"defeat a candidate who is adverse to the interests they 
care to advance." ll The typical example is a member 
of one party deliberately entering another's primary to 
help nominate a weaker candidate, so that his own party's 
nominee might win more easily in the general election. 
A State does have an interest in preventing such be-
havior, lest "the efficacy of the party system in the 
democratic process-its usefulness in providing a unity 
of divergent factions in an alliance for power-be seri-
ously impaired." Rosario Y. Rockefeller, - F. 2d -
(CA2). The court belo"· held flatly that the state in-
terest in deterring "raiding" \\'as a "compelling" one. 
!d., at -. 
The matter, however, is not so easily resolved. The 
compelling nature of any such interest cannot be deter-
mined in a vacuum, but rather in the context of the 
means advanced by the State to protect it and the con-
stitutionally sensitive activity it operates to impede. 
The state interest here is hardly compelling enough to 
sustain the presumption, upon which the statute appears 
to be based, that all persons who change or declare party 
affiliation nearer than eight to 11 months to a party 
primary do so with intent to raid that primary. Any 
such presumption assumes a willingness to manipulate 
the system which is not likely to be widespread. 
11 Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 29. 
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Political parties in this country traditionally have been 
characterized by a fluidity and overlap of philosophy and 
membership. And citizens generally declare or alter 
party a.ffiliation for reasons quite unconnected with any 
premeditated intention to disrupt or frustrate the plans 
of a party with which they are not in sympathy. Citi-
zens customarily choose a party and vote in its primary 
simply because it presents candidates and issues more 
responsive to their immediate concerns and aspirations. 
Such candidates or issues often arc not apparent eight to 
11 months before a primary. That a citizen should be 
absolutely precluded so far in advance from voting in a 
party primary in response to a sympathetic candidate, 
a new or meaningful issue, or changing party philosophies 
in his State. runs contrary to the basic rights of personal 
choice and expression which voting in this country was 
designed to serve. 
Whatever state interest exists for preventing cross-
overs from one party to another is appreciably lessened 
where, as in the case of petitioners, there has been no 
previous affiliation with any political party. The danger 
of voters in sympathy with one party "raiding" another 
party is insubstantial where the voter has made no prior 
party commitment at all. Certainly, the danger falls 
short of the compelling state interest needed to justify 
denying petitioners, so far in advance, the right to declare 
an initial party affiliation and vote in the party primary 
of their choice. 
III 
In Dunn, supra, at 343, the Court emphasized that the 
State, in pursuing its legitimate interest, 
"cannot choose means which unnecessarily burden or 
restrict constitutionally protected activity. Statutes 
affecting constitutional rights must be drawn with 
'precision' NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 419, 438 
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(1963); United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 265 
( 1967), and must be 'tailored' to serve their legiti-
mate objectives. Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, 394 
U. S., at 631. And if there are other, reasonable 
ways to achieve these goals with a lessser burden on 
constitutionally protected activity, a State may not 
choose the way of greater interference. If it acts at 
all, it must choose 'less drastic means.' " Shelton 
v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488 (1960). 
The Court states that placing the enrollment deadline 
before the preceding general election serves well the 
state interest in discouraging party "raiding."'" This 
fails to address the critical question of whether that inter-
est may be protected adequately by less severe measures. 
A foreshortening of the challenged period in this case 
would not leave the party structure of New York helpless 
and vulnerable to "raiding" activities. Other States, with 
varied and complex party systems, have maintained them 
successfully without the advanced enrollment deadline· 
imposed by New York. 
Partisan political activities do not constantly engage 
the attention of large numbers of Americans, especially 
as party labels and loyalties tend to be less persuasive 
than issues and the qualities of individual candidates. 
The crossover in registration from one party to another 
is most often impelled by motives quite unrelated to a 
desire to raid or distort a party's primary. To the extent 
that deliberate raiding occurs, it is usually the result of 
organized effort which depends for its success upon some 
relatively immediate concern or interest of the voters. 
This type of effort is more likely to occur as a primary 
date draws near. If new York were to adopt a more 
reasonable enrollment deadline, say 30 to 60 days, the 
period most vulnerable to raiding activity would be pro-
1 " Court opinion, p. 9. 
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tected. More importantly, a less drastic enrollment l 
deadline than the eight or 11 months now imposed by 
New York would make the franchise and oportunities 
for legitimate party participation available to those who 
constitutionally have the right to exercise them."' 
13 Petitioners also SUI/:ge8t other "less drastic" mr~ms ol' protrrting 
the State's intrrrHt: greater reliance on the Rummary disrurollme11t 
procedures of § 333 of the State's dection law and loyalt~· oaths, 
rcstricti1·e party afftliation rules optional for those partirs who wish 
them, limitat ion of the statute's operation to pers011R with pre-
existing part~· affiliations, and crimiu:-~1 sanctions for frauclulrnt par-
ticipation in thr elrctoral process. Tr. of Oral Arl/:. , pp. 13-21. I 
make no judgment either on the efficacy of these alternati1·es in 
protecting the State's intrre~t or on their potential infringrmrnt of 
constitutionally protected rightH. Their pre~rncr, howr,·er , point s 
to the range and y:uiety of other experimental techniqurs aYailablc 
for New York to consider. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
.§npumc <ronrt of tl!c ':11nitttt §tah•g 
' ';nlas-lrmgtcn. :n. <.!;. 20,5'~3 
February 15, 1973 
Re: Bo. 71-1371 - Rosario v. Rockefeller 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 71- 1371 
Pedro J. Rosario et al., 
Petitioners, 
v. 
Nelson Rockefeller, Governor 
of the State of New 
York, et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari to 
the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit. 
[March -, 19731 
Mn. Jus·riCE Po-wELL, with whom MR. JusTICE DouG-
LAS, MR. Jus·riCE BRENNAN, and Mn. JusTICE MARSHALL 
joi11, dissenting. 
I 
It is important at the outset to place New York's cut-
off date for party enrollment in perspective. It prevents 
prospective voters from registering for a party primary 
some eight months before a presidential primary and 11 
months before a nonpresidential one.1 The Court rec-
ognizes, as it must, that the period between the enroll-
ment and the primary election is a "lengthy" one.2 In-
deed, no other State has imposed upon voters previously 
unaffiliated with any party restrictions which even ap-
proach in severity those of New York. 3 And New York 
1 October 2, 1971, was the b st day on which petitioners' enrollment 
could have been effective. June 20, 1972, was the date of New York's 
presidential primary. Thus the deadline was actually some eight 
and one-half months before the primary. In nonpresiclential years, 
the cutoff runs from early October until the following September. 
2 Court opinion, p. 8. 
3 The State docs not dispute this point. See Tr. of Oral Arg. , p. 34. 
Massachusetts, Illinois, Ohio, New .Jersey, and Texas permit pre-
Yiously unaffiliated Yoters to declare their initial party affiliation 
immediately prior to voting in the primary of their choice. See 
Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, c. 53,§§ 37, 38; Illinois Annotated 
Statutes, §§ 5-30; 7-43-7-45; New Jersey Statutcs Annotated, 
71-1:371-DISSENT 
2 ROSARIO v. ROCKEFELLER 
concedes that only one other State-Kentucky-has im-
posed as stringent a primary registration deadline on 
persons with prior party affiliations.4 Confronted with 
such a facially burdensome requirement, I find the Court's 
opinion unconvincing. 
The right of all persons to vote, once the State has 
decided to make it available to some, becomes a basic 
one under the Constitution. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 
U. S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 
395 U. S. 621 (1969); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89 
(1965). Self-expression through the public ballot equally 
with one's peers is the essence of a democratic society. 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964). A citizen with-
out a vote is to a large extent one without a voice in 
decisions which may profoundly affect him and his family. 
Whatever his disagreement may be with the judgments 
of public officials, the citizen should never be given just 
cause to think that he was denied an equal right to 
elect them. 
Yet the Court today upholds a statute which imposes 
substantial and unnecessary restrictions on this right, 
as well as on the closely related right to associate with 
the party of one's choice. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 
U. S. 23 (1968); NAACP Y. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 
19 :2:l-45; Yernon's Annotatrd Texas Statutes, Tit. 9, Art. 1:).01a; 
Ohio Revised Code, § 351:3.19. 
Californi::t and Pennsylvania permit prc\· iou~ly unafli.liatrd \·oten; 
to declare an initial part~· prcfrrence up to thr rlose of rrgistration 
immediately precrdinp: thr primar~·. California Elrction Corle.§§ 22, 
203. 311-312 (rrgist ration rlosrs in Califor11ia s:l day~ brforc a 
primary); Purdon's Pmm~~·lyania Statutes Annotated. Tit. 25, §§ 291 
et seq. (rrgistrntion rlo~es in Pcnns,\·lnnja 50 cia~-~ bcl'ore a 
primary). 
Michigan permits any registered voter to participate in the pri-
mary of his choice. Michigan Compiled Lnw:-; Anuotatrd, §§ 168.!)70, 
168.575-168.576. Sec Petitioner:-;' Brief, pp. :~2-33. 
4 'I r. of Oral Arg. , p. 34. 
.. 
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(1958); United States Y. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967). 
The Court justifies this holding by placing the responsi-
bility upon petitioners for their failure to enroll, as 
required by New York law, eight months prior to the 
presidential primary. vYe arc told that petitioners 
"clearly could have registered and enrolled in the party 
of their choice" before the cutoff date and been eligible 
to vote in the primary, but for undetermined reasons 
"chose not to," and that their disenfranchisement re-
sulted from "their own failure to take timely steps to 
effect their enrollment." " 
If the cutoff elate were a less severe one, I could agree. 
Certainly, the State is justified in imposing a reasonable 
registration cutoff prior to any primary or general elec-
tion, beyond which a citizen's failure to register may be 
presmned a negligent or wilful act forfeiting his right 
to vote in a particular election. But it is difficult to 
perceive any persuasive basis for a registration or party 
enrollment deadline eight to 11 months prior to election. 
Failure to cornply with such an extreme deadline can 
hardly be used to .i ustify denial of a fundamental constitu-
tional right. ::\f"umcrous prior decisions impose on us the 
obligation to protect the coutinuinug availability of the 
franchise for all citizens, not to sanction its prolonged de-
ferment or deprivation. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 
37 (1879); Ni.1:on v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Lane 
Y. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268 (1939); Balfer v. Carr, 369 U. S. 
189 (1962); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368 (1963); 
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v. 
Sims, supra; Carrington v. Rash, supra; Harper v. Vir-
ginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1966); Kramer 
v. Union Free School District, supra; Cipriano v. City 
" Court opinion, pp. 5, 6. See al;;o p. 10 wherr the Court refer:; 
to § 186 as merPly impoHing "a lPgitimate time limitation on their 
[petitioners' J emollment, which they chose to di~rPgard." 
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of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Evans v. Cornman, 398 
U. S. 419 (1970); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 
U.S. 204 (1970); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); 
Dunn v. Blumstein, supra. 
The majority excuses the challenged statute because 
it does not "absolutely" disenfranchise petitioners or im-
pose any absolute ban on their freedom of association.6 
The State likewise contends this is "not a disenfranchis-· 
ing statute." 7 The Court apparently views this stat- , 
ute as a mere "time deadline" on petitioners' enrollment 
that disadvantages no identifiable class and that post-
pones through the next primary rather than denies alto-
0 See the Court's opinion, at p. 5: 
"Section 186 of New York's Election Law, however, is quite differcut. 
It did not absolutely disenfranchise the class to which the petitioners 
belong-newly registered voters who were eligible to enroll in a 
party before the previous general election. Rather, the statutes 
merely imposed a time deadline on their enrollment, which they had 
to meet in order to participate in the nexi primary." 
Similarly at p. 6: 
"For the same rea.-on , we reject the petitioner:;' argumrnt that § 186 
Yiolated their First and Fourthteenth Amendment right of free asso-
ciation with the political party of their choice. Since they could 
have enrollrd in a party in time to pnrtiripate in tho Junr 1972 
primary, § 186 did not constitute a ban on their frerdom of associa-
tion, but merely a time limitation on when they had to art in order 
to participate in their chosen party's next primar~'·" 
And p. 10: 
"New York did not prohibit the petitioners from ,·oting in the 1972 
primary election or from associating with the politirnl part~· of 1 heir 
choice. It merely imposed a legitimate time limitation on their 
enrollment, which they chose to disregard." 
In all these instances, the majority seeks to distinguish a "time lim-
itation" from an absolute disenframhisemcnt of petitioners or an 
absolute ban on their as~ociational rights. 
7 Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 35. 
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gether petitioners' voting and associational rights.s I I 
cannot agree. Deferment of a right, especially one as 
sensitive and essential as the exercise of the first duty of 
citizenship, can be tantamount to its denial. And any 
statute which imposes for eight or 11 months an absolute 
freeze on party enrollment and the consequent right to I 
vote totally disenfranchises a class of persons who, for 
quite legitimate reasons, decide to register closer than 
eight months to the primary date and those who, for 
equally legitimate reasons, wish to choose or alter party 
affiliation. Our decisions, moreover, have never required 
a permanent ban on the exercise of voting and associa-· 
tional rights before a constitutional breach is incurred. 
Rather, they have uniformly recognized that any serious 
burden or infringement on such "constitutionally pro-
tected activity" is sufficient to establish a constitutional 
violation, Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, at 343; NAACP v. 
Button, 371 U. S. 419, 438 (1963); Reynolds v. Sims, 
supra, at 561-562. 
II 
The majority does not identify the standard of scru--
tiny it applies to the New York statute. We are told 
only that the cutoff date is "not an arbitrary time limit 
unconnected to any important state goal"; 9 that it is. 
"tied to a particularized legitimate purpose and is in no 
sense invidious or arbitrary." 10 The Court does not 
explain why this formulation was chosen, what precedents 
support it, or how and in what contexts it is to be ap-
plied. Such nebulous promulgations are bound to leave 
the lower courts and state legislatures in doubt and con-
fusion as to how we will approach future significant bur-· 
s Court opinion, p. 5 and n. 6 supra. 
9 Court opinion, p. 8. 
10 I d., p. 9. ' 
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dens on the right to vote and to associate freely with the 
party of one's choice. 
The Court's formulation, though the terminology is 
somewhat stronger, resemblE's the traditional equal pro-
tection "rational basis" test. One may agree that the 
challenged cutoff date is rationally related to the legiti-
mate interest of New York in preventing party "raiding." 
But this Court's prior decisions simply do not permit 
such an approach. Rather, they recognize that: 
" ... the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter 
in a free and democratic society. Especially since 
the right to exercise the franchise in a free and un-
impaired manner is preservative of other basic civil 
and political rights, any alleged infringement of the 
right of citizens to vote must be carefully and 
meticulously scrutinized." Reynolds v. Sims, sttpra, 
at 561-562. 
See also Yick TVa v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886). 
Voting in a party primary is as protected against state 
encroachment as voting in a general election. Bullock 
v. Carter, supra; Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953); 
Un-ited States v. ClaBsic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). And the 
Court has said quite explicitly that "if a challenged stat-
ute grants the right to vote to some citizens and denies the 
franchise to others, 'the Court must determine \vhether 
the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling 
state interest.' " Dunn Y. Blumstein, supra, at 337 
(1972), quoting Kramer Y. Union Free School Distr-ict, 
supra, at 627. Sec also Cipriano Y. City of Houma, supra, 
at 704 (1969); City of Phoeni.'"C v. Kolodziejski, supra, 
at 205, 209 (1970). Likewise, the Court has asserted 
that "the right of individuals to associate for the ad-
vancement of political beliefs" is "among our most 
precious freedoms," W ·illiams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S., supra, 
30-31 (1968), and must be carefully protected from state 
encroachment. NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 449 
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(1958); Bates v. Diltle Rock, 361 U. S. 516 (1960); Gib-
son Y. Florida Legislative Investigations Committee, 372 
u. s. 53!) (1963) . 
The inquiry thus becomes whether the instant statute, J 
burdening as it does fundamental constitutional rights, 
can withstand the strict judicial scrutiny called for by 
our prior cases. The asserted state interest in this case1 
is the prevention of party "raiding," which consists of the 
nwvement or "cross-over" by members of one party into 
another's primary to "defeat a candidate who is adverse 
to the interests they care to advance." ~., The typical 
example is a member of one party deliberately entering 
another's primary to help nominate a weaker candidate, 
so that his own party's nominee might vvin nwre easily in 
the general election. A State does have an interest in 
preventing such behavior, lest "the efficacy of the party 
system in the democratic process- its usefulness in pro-
viding a unity of divergent factions in an alliance for 
power-be seriously impaired," Rosairo v. Rockefeller, 
-F. 2d- (CA2). The court below held flatly that 
the state in tcrest in deterring "raiding" was a "compel-
ling" one. I d., at --. 
The matter, however, is not so easily resolved. The I 
importance or significance of any such interest cannot be 
determined in a vacuum, but rather in the context of the 
means advanced by the State to protect it and the con-
stitutionally sensitive activity it operates to impede. 
The state interest here is hardly substa11tial enough to ~ 
sustain the presumption, upon which the statute appears 
to be based, that most persons who change or declare party 
affiliation nearer than eight to 11 months to a party 
primary do so with intent to raid tha.t primary. Any 
such presumption assumes a willingness to manipulate 
the system which is not likely to be widespread. 
11 Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 29. 
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Political parties ln this country traditionally have been 
characterized by a fluidity and overlap of philosophy and 
membership. And citizens generally declare or alter 
party affiliation for reasons quite unconnected with any 
premeditated intention to disrupt or frustrate the plans 
of a party with which they are not in sympathy. Citi-
zens customarily choose a party and vote in its primary 
simply because it presents candidates and issues more 
responsive to their immediate concerns and aspirations. 
Such candidates or issues often are not apparent eight to 
11 months before a primary. That a citizen should be 
absolutely precluded so far in advance from voting in a 
party primary in response to a sympathetic candidate, 
a new or meaningful issue, or changing party philosophies I 
in his State, runs contrary to the fundamental rights of 
personal choice and expression which voting in this coun-
try was designed to serve. 
Whatever state interest exists for preventing cross-
overs from one party to another is appreciably lessened 
where, as in the case of petitioners, there has been no 
previous affiliation with any political party. The danger 
of voters in sympathy with one party "raiding" another 
party is insubstantial where the voter has made no prior 
party commitment at all. Certainly, the danger falls 
short of the overriding state interest needed to justify 1 
denying petitioners, so far in advance, the right to declare 
an initial party affiliation and vote in the party primary 
of their choice. 
III 
In Dunn, supra, at 343, the Court emphasized that the 
State, in pursuing its legitimate interest, 
"cannot choose means which unnecessarily burden or 
restrict constitutionally protected activity. Statutes 
affecting constitutional rights must be drawn with 
'precision' NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 419, 438 
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(1963); United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 265 
( 1967), and must be 'tailored' to serve their legiti-
mate objectives. Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, 394 
U. S., at 631. And if there are other, reasonable 
ways to achieve these goals with a lessser burden on 
constitutionally protected activity, a State may not 
choose the way of greater interference. If it acts at 
all, it must choose 'less drastic means.' " Shelton 
v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488 (1960). 
The Court states that placing the enrollment deadline 
before the preceding general election serves well the 
state interest in discouraging party "raiding.1112 This. 
fails to address the critical question of whether that inter-
est may be protected adequately by less severe measures. 
A foreshortening of the challenged period in this case 
would not leave the party structure of New York help less 
and vulnerable to "raiding" activities. Other States, with 
varied and complex party systems, have maintained them 
successfully without the advanced enrollment deadline 
imposed by New York. 
Partisan political activities do not constantly engage 
the attention of large numbers of Americans, especially 
as party labels and loyalties tend to be less persuasive 
than issues and the qualities of individual candidates. 
The crossover in registration from one party to another 
is most often impelled by motives quite unrelated to a 
desire to raid or distort a party's primary. To the extent 
that deliberate raiding occurs, it is usually the result of 
organized effort which depends for its success upon some 
relatively immediate concern or interest of the voters. 
This type of effort is more likely to occur as a primary 
date draws near. If New York were to adopt a more 
reasonable enrollment deadline, say 30 to 60 days, the 
period most vulnerable to raiding activity would be pro-
1 " Court opinion, p. 9. 
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tected. More importantly, a less drastic enrollment 
deadline than the eight or 11 months now imposed by 
New York would make the franchise and oportunities 
for legitimate party participation available to those who 
constitutionally have the right to exercise them.n 
13 Petitioners also suggest other "less drastic" means of protecting 
the State's interesL: greater reliance on the summnry disenrollment 
procedures of § 332 of the State's election law and loyalty oathH,. 
restrictiYe party affiliation rules optional for those parties who wish 
them, limitation of the statute's operation to persons with pre-
existing party affiliations, and criminal sanctions for fraudulent par-
ticipation in the electoral process. Tr. of Ornl Arg., p]l. 13-21. I 
make no judgment either on the efficacy of these alternatiYes in 
protecting the State's inLerest or on their potential infrin11:emcnt of 
constitutionally protected rights. Their pre~ence, however, points 
to the range and variety of other experimental techniques available· 
for New York to consider. 
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I 
It is important at the outset to place New York's cut-
oft' date for party enrollment in perspective. It prevents 
prospective voters from registering for a party primary 
some eight months before a presidential primary and 11 
months before a nonpresidential one.1 The Court rec-
ognizes, as it must, that the period between the enroll-
ment and the primary election is a "lengthy" one. 2 In-
deed, no other State has imposed upon voters previously 
unaffiliated with any party restrictions which even ap-
proach in severity those of New York.8 And New York 
1 October 2, 1971, was the last day on which petitioners' enrollment 
could have been effective. June 20, 1972, was the date of New York's 
presidential primary. Thus the deadline was actually some eight 
and one-half months before the primary. In nonpresidential years, 
the cutoff runs from early October until the following September. 
2 Court opinion, p. 8. 
3 The State does not dispute this point. See Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 34. 
Massachusetts, Illinois, Ohio, New Jersey, and Texas permit pre-
viously unaffiliated voters to declare their initial party affiliation 
immediately prior to voting in the primary of their choice. See 
Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, c. 53,§§ 37, 38; Illinois Annotated 
Statutes, §§ 5-30: 7-43-7-45 ; New Jersey Statutes Annotated~ 
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concedes that only one other State-Kentucky_:_has im-
posed as stringent a primary registration deadline on 
persons with prior party affiliations.4 Confronted with 
such a facially burdensome requirement, I find the Court's 
• • • 0 
opmwn unconvmcmg. 
The right of all persons to vote, once the State has 
decided to make it available to some, becomes a basic 
one under the Constitution. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 
U. S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 
395 U. S. 621 (1969); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89 
( 1965). Self -expression through the public ballot equally 
with one's peers is the essence of a democratic society. 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). A citizen with-
out a vote is to a large extent one without a voice in 
decisions which may profoundly affect him and his family. 
Whatever his disagreement may be with the judgments 
of public officials, the citizen should never be given just 
cause to think that he was denied an equal right to 
elect them. 
Yet the Court today upholds a statute which imposes 
substantial and unnecessary restrictions on this right, 
as well .as on the closely related right to associate with 
the party of one's choice. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 
U. S. 23 (1968); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 
19:23-45; Vernon's Annotated Texas Statutes, Tit. 9, Art. 13.01a; 
Ohio Revised Code, § 3513.19. 
California and Penm;ylvania permit prev10u~ly unaffiliated voters 
to drclarr an ini1ial party prrfrrenec up to the close of registration 
immediately preceding the primary. California Election Code, §§ 22, 
203, 311-312 (registration closes in California 53 days before n. 
primary); Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated, Tit. 25, §§ 291 
et seq. (rrgistration closes in Prnnsylvanja 50 days before a 
primary) 
Michigan permits any reg1sterrd vo1Pr to participate in the pri-
mary of lu~ choice. Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated, §§ 168.570, 
108.575-16R.576. Sre Peti1ionPrs' Brief, pp. 32-33. 
1 Tr of Oral Arg., p. 34. 
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(1958); United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967). 
The Court justifies this holding by placing the responsi-
bility upon petitioners for their failure to enroll, as 
required by New York law, eight months prior to the 
presidential primary. We are told that petitioners 
"clearly could have registered and enrolled in the party 
of their choice" before the cutoff date and been eligible 
to vote in the primary, but for undetermined reasons 
"chose not to," and that their disenfranchisement re-
sulted from "their own failure to take timely steps to 
effect their enrollment." 5 
If the cutoff date were a less severe one, I could agree. 
Certainly, the State is justified in imposing a reasonable 
registration cutoff prior to any primary or general elec-
tion, beyond which a citizen's failure to register may be 
presumed a negligent or wilful act forfeiting his right 
to vote in a particular election. But it is difficult to 
perceive any persuasive basis for a registration or party 
enrollment deadline eight to 11 months prior to election. 
Failure to comply with such an extreme deadline can 
hardly be used to justify denial of a fundamental constitu-
tional right. Numerous prior decisions impose on us the 
obligation to protect the continuing availability of the 
franchise for all citizens, not to sanction its prolonged de-
ferment or deprivation. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 
37 (1879); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Lane 
v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
189 (1962); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368 (1963); 
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v. 
Sims, supra; Carrington v. Rash, supra; Harper v. Vir-
ginia Board of Election.s, 383 U. S. 663 (1966); Kramer 
v. Union Free School District, supra; Cipriano v. City 
5 Court opmion, pp. 5, 6. Sre also p . 10 where the Court refers 
to § 186 as merely imposing "a lrgitimatr time limitlltion on theil" 
(Jwtitioners'l enrollment. which thry choHe to di::;rf'gard ." 
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of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Evans v. Cornman, 398 
U. S. 419 (1970); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 39g 
U.S. 204 (1970); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); 
Dunn v. Blumstein, supra. 
The majority excuses the challenged statute because 
it does not "absolutely" disenfranchise petitioners or im~ 
pose any absolute ban on their freedom of association.(!' 
The State likewise contends this is "not a disenfranchis-
ing statute." 7 The Court apparently views this stat-
ute as a mere "time deadline" on petitioners' enrollment 
that disadvantages no identifiable class and that post-
pones through the next primary rather than denies alto-
n See the Court's opinion, at p. 5: 
'"Section li\6 of New York's Election Law, however, i~ quite different. 
It did not absolutely eli enfranchise the class to which the prtitioners 
belong-newly registered voters who were rligible to enroll in a 
party before the previous general election. Rather, the statutes 
merely imposed a time deadline on their enrollment, which they had 
to meet in ordrr to participate in the next primary." 
Similarly at p. 6: 
"For thr samr rrason, we rrject the prtitioners' argument that § 186 
vwlatrd their First and Fourthternth Amendment right of free asso-
ciation with the political party of their choice. Since they could 
have rnrollecl in a party in time to participate in the June 1972 
pnmary, § 186 did not constitute a ban on their freedom of associa-
tiOn, but merely a time limitation on whrn they had to act in order 
to participate in their chosen party's next primary." 
And p . 10: 
"New York did nDt prohibit the petitioners from voting in the 1972 
primary electwn or from associating with the political party of their 
choice. It merely imposed a legitimate time limitation on their 
enrollment, which they chose to disregard." 
In all these in:;tances, the majority serks to distinguish a "time lim--
itation" from an absolute disrnfranchisement of petitioners or an 
~b:;olute ban on then associittional rights . 
7 Tr of Oral Arg., p. 35 
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gether petitioners· voting and associational rights.8 I 
cannot agree. Deferment of a right, especially one as 
sensitive and essential as the exercise of the first duty of 
citizenship, can be tantamount to its denial. And any 
statute which imposes for eight or 11 months an absolute 
freeze on party enrollment and the consequent right to 
vote totally disenfranchises a class of persons who, for 
quite legitimate reasons, decide to register closer than 
eight months to the primary date and those who, for 
equal1y legitimate reasons. wish to choose or alter party 
affiliation. Our decisions. moreover. have never required 
a permanent ban on the exercise of voting and associa-
tional •rights before a constitutional breach is incurred. 
Rather. they have uniformly recognized that any serious 
burden or infringement on such "constitutionally pro-
tected activity" is sufficient to establish a constitutional 
violation. Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, at 343; NAACP v. 
Button, 371 U. S. 419. 438 (1963); Reynolds v. Sims, 
supr-a, at 561-562. 
If 
The majority does not identify the standard of scru-
tiny it applies to the New York statute. We are told 
only that the cutoff date is "not an arbitrary time limit 
unconnected to any important state goal"; 9 that it is 
"tied to a particularized legitimate purpose and is in no 
sense invidious or arbitrary." 10 The Court does not 
explain why this formulation was chosen, what precedents 
support it, or how and in what contexts it is to be ap~ 
plied. Such nebulous promulgations are bound to leave 
the lower courts and state legislatures in doubt and con-
fusion as to how we will approach future significant bur-. 
'Court opiJllon. p. 5 and tt (i supra , 
u Court opmwn, p . 8, 
'"ld , I?· 9, 
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dens 011 the right to vote and to associate freely with the 
party of one's choice. 
The Court's formulation, though the terminology is 
somewhat stronger, resembles the traditional equal pro-
tection "rational basis" test. One may agree that the 
challenged cutoff date is rationally related to the legiti-
mate interest of New York in preventing party "raiding." 
But this Court's prior decisions simply do not permit 
such an approach. Rather, they recognize that : 
" . .. the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter 
in a free and democratic society. Especially since· 
the right to exercise the franchise in a free and un-
impaired manner is preservative of other basic civil 
and political rights, any alleged infringement of the 
right of citizens to vote must be carefully and 
meticulously scrutinized." Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 
at 561-562. 
See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886). 
Voting in a party primary is as protected against state· 
encroachment as voting in a general election. Bullock 
v. Carter, supra; Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953); 
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). And the 
Court has said quite explicitly that "if a challenged stat-
ute grants the right to vote to some citizens and denies the 
franchise to others, 'the Court must determine whether 
the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling 
state interest.' '' Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, at 337 
(1972), quoting Kramer v. Union Free School District, 
supra, at 627. See also Cipriano v. City of Houma, supra, 
at 704 (1969); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, supra, 
at 205, 209 (1970). Likewise, the Court has asserted 
that "the right of individuals to associate for the ad-
vancement of political beliefs" is "among our most 
precious freedoms." Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S., supra, 
30-31 (1968). and must be carefully protected from state· 
Pncroachment NAACP v Alabama. supra, at 4491 
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(1958); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); Gib-
son v. Florida Legislative Investigations Committee, 372 
U. S. 539 (1963) . 
The inquiry thus becomes whether the instant statute, 
burdening as it does fundamental constitutional rights, 
can withstand the strict judicial scrutiny called for by 
our prior cases. The asserted state interest in this case 
ts the prevention of party "raiding,'' which consists of the 
movement or "cross-over" by members of one party into 
another's primary to "defeat a candidate who is adverse 
~o the interests they care to advance." u The typical 
example is a member of one party deliberately entering 
another's primary to help nominate a weaker candidate, 
so that his own party's nominee might win more easily in 
the general election. A State does have an interest in 
preventing such behavior, lest "the efficacy of the party 
system in the democratic process-its usefulness in pro-
\.licling a unity of divergent factions in an alliance for 
power-be seriously impaired.'' Rosairo v. Rockefeller, 
-- F. 2d- (CA2). The court below held flatly that 
the state interest in deterring "raiding'' was a "compel-
llng" OIH' . fd., at --
The matter, however, is not so easily resolved. The , 
1~nportance or significance of any such interest cannot be 
drtermined m a vacuum, but rather in the context of the 
means advanced by the State to protect it and the con-
stitutionally sensitive activity it operates to impede. 
The state llltrrest here is hardly substantial enough to 
s.ustain the presumption, upon which the statute appears 
t.o be based, that most persons who change or declare party 
affiliation nearer than eight to 11 months to a party 
jlrimary do so with intent to raid that primary. Any 
such presumption assumes a willingness to manipulate 
the system which is not likely to be widespread. 
l 7 T! . ot Ornl. Arg p 29. 
71-1a7l- DISSENT 
8 ROSARIO v. ROCKEFELLER 
Political parties iu this country traditionally have beert 
characterized by a fluidity and overlap of philosophy and 
membership. And citi.10ens generally declare. or alter 
party affiliation for reasons quite unconnected with any 
premeditated intention to disrupt or frustrate the plans 
of a party with which they are not in sympathy. Ci€1-
zens customarily choose a party and vote in its primary 
sunply because it presents candidates and issues more 
responsive to their immediate concerns and aspirations. 
Such candidates or issues often are not apparent eight to 
11 months before a primary. That a citizen should be 
absolutely precluded so far in advance from voting in a 
party primary in response to a sympathetic candidate, 
a new or meaningful issue. or changing party philosophies 
in his State. runs contrary to the fundamental rights of 
personal choice and expression which voting in this coun-
try was designed to serve. 
. Whatever state interest exists for preventing cross-
overs from one party to another is appreciably lessened 
where, as in the case of petitioners, there has been no 
previous affiliation with any political party. The danger 
of voters in sympathy with one party "raiding" another 
party is insubstantial where the voter has made no prior 
party commitment at all. Certainly, the danger falls 
short of the overriding state interest needed to justify 
denying petitioners, so far in advance, the right to declare 
an initial party affiliation and vote in the party primary 
of their choice. 
Til 
In Dunn, supra, at 343, the Court emphasized that the· 
State, in pursuing its legitimate interest, 
"cannot choose means which unnecessarily burden or 
restrict constitutionally protected activity. Statutes 
affecting constitutional rights must be drawn with 
'precision' NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 419, 438· 
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(1963); United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 265 
( 1967), and must be 'tailored' to serve their legiti-
mate objectives. Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, 394 
U. S., at 631. And if there are other, reasonable 
ways to achieve these goals with a lessser burden on 
constitutionally protected activity, a State may not 
choose the way of greater interference. If it acts at 
all, it must choose 'less drastic means.' " Shelton 
v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488 (1960). 
The Court states that placing the enrollment deadline 
before the preceding general election serves well the 
state interest in discouraging party "raiding."12 This 
fails to address the critical question of whether that inter-
est may be protected adequately by less severe measures. 
A foreshortening of the challenged period in this case 
would not leave the party structure of New York helpless 
and vulnerable to "raiding" activities. Other States, with 
varied and complex party systems, have maintained them 
successfully without the advanced enrollment deadline 
imposed by New York. 
Partisan political activities do not constantly engage 
the attention of large numbers of Americans, especially 
as party labels and loyalties tend to be less persuasive 
than issues and the qualities of individual candidates. 
The crossover in registration from one party to another 
is most often impelled by motives quite unrelated to a 
desire to raid or distort a party's primary. To the extent 
·that deliberate raiding occurs, it is usually the result of 
organized effort which depends for its success upon some 
relatively immediate concern or interest of the voters. 
This type of effort is more likely to occur as a primary 
date draws near. If New York were to adopt a more 
reasonable enrollment deadline, say 30 to 60 days, the 
period most vulnerable to raiding activity would be pro ... 
'· 2 C,onr1, opinion, p . 9 .. 
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tected. More importantly, a less drastic enrollment 
deadline than the eight or 11 months now imposed by 
N e'Y' York would make the franchise and oportunities 
for legitimate party participation available to those who 
constitutionally have the right to exercise them.13 
13 Petitioners also suggest other "less drast1c" means of protecting 
the State's interest: greater reliance on the summary disenrollment 
procedures of § 332 of the State's election law and loyalty oaths, 
restrictive party affiliation rules optional for those parties who wish 
them, limitation of the statute's operation to persons with pre-
existing party affiliations, and criminal sanctions for fraudulent par-
ticipation in the electoral process. Tr. of Oral Arg., pp. 13-21. I 
make no jt1dgment e1ther on the efficacy of these alternatives in 
protectmg the State's interest or on their potential infringement of 
constitutionally protected rights. Thmr presence, however, points. 
to the range and variety of other experimental techniques available; 
(or New York to cons1der .. 
I 












No. 71-1371 Rosario v. Rockefeller 
PER CURIAM. 
The State of New York provides in its Election Law 
for a closed primary system, in which only duly enrolled 
'-.......__.....-- -...._.. ......... 
members of a political party may vote in that party's 
primary election. Section 186 of the Election L,w further 
provides that a~i~ter~d voter enrolls i9 a P3littcal 
party, he must wait until after the next general blection 
I 
before he may vote in a primary election. __ ! I Petitioners are 
New York residents who registered to vote and enrolled in a 
' ::::. 
political party in December 1971, one month after a genera} 
election. Consequently they are barred by the waiting period --------- \ 
of Section 186 from voting in a political primary until after 
the November 1972 general election; in particular, they are 
barred from voting in the primary scheduled to. ta~e place on 
June 20, 1972, in which the political parti0s will select, 
inter alia, delegates to the national conventions that will 
in turn nominate candidates for President and Vice-President 
of the United States.Y 
Petitioners filed these complaints, ' pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, seeking a declaratory judgment that Section 186 violates 
federal constttutional requirements.~ _ _/ The District Court 
granted declaratory relief, ___ F.Supp. (1972), but the 
Court of Appeals reversed, __ F.2d ___ (1972) • .!!_/ Because 
we regard our recent decision in Dunn v. Blumstein, , U.S. 
(1972) as controlling, '"e erant certiorari and reverse. 
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a compelling state interest and • • • it does so in a manner 
calculated to impinge minimally ~First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights." __ Fo2d __ , __ no4. We cannot agree, 
however, that Section 186 satisfies that test. 
I 
~we sustained a challenge to a stat~te that 
prohibited otherwise eligible persons from votinf until they 
had been residents of the State for one year and 1residents of 
the county for threeill)nths prior to the election. Recognizing 
the State's interest in confining the vote to bona fide residents, 
we held that interest could not justify a statute confining the 
vote to persons who had been reSdents for the prescribed 
periods. The vice of the statute was that it was not 
narrowly tailored: duration of residence was an impermissibly ----crude test of bona fide residence. Thus the statute denied 
recent arrivals the right to vote, even if they were bona 
fide residents, without any compelling justification for 
distinguishing them from other bona fide residents. 
The New Yo:rk statute at issue here suffers from a - :::.. 
similar defect. New York argues that it has a valid 
interest in confining the right to vote in primary elections 
to bona fide members of the party in which they vote. The 
State claims the statute is designed to prevent a phenomenon 
it describes as "raiding'', whereby voters whose political 
loyalty is to one party fraudulently designate themselves 
as members of another party, in order to influence the 



















in accordance with their bona fide party loyalties; 
accordingly, the statute puts the would-be raide r "in the 
unseemly position of asking to be enrolled in one party 
while at the same time in·tending to vote immediately for 
another." F.2d. at • 
I 
We assume for purposes of this case th~t thF State has 
a legitimate interest in restricting the prLmary\ vote to 
bona fide members of the party in which they vote. Moreover, 
we recognize that Section 186 may have some tendency to 
promote that interest. Nevertheless, it is clear that the 
waiting period of Section 186, like the durational residence 
requirement in Dunn, is not narrowly tailored to promote 
that objective. 
This case does not present the question whether a 
State may impose such a waiting period on voters who 
change their allegiance from one party to another. Cf. 
----- ...-Lippett v. Cipollone, ___ U.S. ___ (1972).~/ New York has 
not confined its restriction to that group, and petitioners 
do not fall in that class. The waiting period of Ses.tion 
.r ...,-=; -
186 is triggered by first-time enrollment in a political 
party, and not by past membership in another parqy. It ----applies to petitioners and their class, who have never before 
registered to vote or enrolled in any political party, and it 
also applies to new residents of the State of New York, who 
may enroll in a political party in order to continue a party 
• 
affiliation of many years' duration.i_! In such cases, the 
















We agree with the District Court's conclusion that 
Section 186 fails to satisfy constitutional requirements. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions to 
reinstate the judgment of the District Court. 
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' I § 186, Ope ning of enrollment box and completion of 
enrolli1ient. All enrollment blanks contained in the enrollment 
box shall remain in such box, and the box shall not be opened 
nor shall any of the blanks be removed therefrom until the 
Tuesday following the day of general election in that year. 
Such box shall then be opened by the board of ' elections and the 
blanks contained therein shall be removed therefrom by the 
board, and the names of the party designated by ~ach voter 
under such declaration, provided such party cont'nues to be a 
party, as defined in this law shall be entered b the board, 
opposite the name of such voter in the appropria e column of 
the two copies of the register containing enrollment numbers for 
the election district in which such voter resides •••• 
Section 187 exempts certain classes of voters from the 
waiting period of Section 186. These exceptions include 
persons who have moved from one place to another within a 
single county, and persons who attained voting age after the 
last general election. Petitioners do not fall within any of 
the excepted classes. 
_3_! The individual petitioners had each attained voting age 
shor :t1Y before·tl:e last general election, and hence were eligible 
to register and enroll in a political party in time to permit 
them to vote in the June 1972 primary election. (Had they 
attained voting age after the general election, they would be 
eligible for late party enrollment pursuant to ~ 187, 
see note __ suprao) Having failed to do so, whether through 
inadvertence, lack of interest in the essentially local 
1971 election, or for other reasons, they sought to participate 
in the first Presidential primary and election for which they 
were eligible. We agree with the District Court that this 
sequenc~ of events cannot be treated ~s a waiver of the right 
to vote, see ___ F.Supp. at ___ • 
~/ The cases originated in two complaints, which were 
consolidated by the district court. One of the complaints 
(that of petitioner Rosario) stated a cause of action on behalf 
of a class, as well as on behalf of the named plaintiffs, and 
the district judge treated the case as a class action. PetitioneJ 
originally sougl1t injunctive as well as declaratory relief, but 
they abandoned their request for injunctive relief; accordingly 
the case was not required to be heard by a three-judge court 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2281. ,t.c...,.,d'1 v . Mt ... ..lv)'\-H .. ..-t . ..,c~, 17~ 1.-f . .>. J'fLI) ~~;:!,·5"~('-, 
jl/ The Court of Appeals denied rehearing en bane, 
Judges Feinberg and Oakes dissenting. 
::__; Li:ppett involved a state statute that imposed a 
waiting period on would-be candidates for office who changed 
their Allegiance from one party to another. xx vle sumrnari ly 
! 
.0 
, ~ .. 
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the party enrollment: of a voter may be challenged by any fellow 
party member and cancelled by a Justice of the State Supreme 
Court upon the determination of the Chairman of the County C ~ 
Committee of the party in the county in which the challenged vote~ 
is enrolled that the vo·ter is not in sympathy with the principles · 
of the party. This provision has been successfully invoked on 
several occasions, see Matter of Zuckman v. Donohue, 191 Misc. 
399, 79 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Sup.Ct.), aff'd 274 A.D. 216, 80 N.Y.S.2d 
698, aff'd 298 N.Y. 627, 81 N.E.2d 371, 86 N.Y.S.2d (1948); 
Matter of Herbel v. Gernstein, 191 Misc. 274, 78 N.Y:5:"2d 440 
(S1.1p.Ct. 19LJ.8); ~1atter of Newkirk, 144 Misc. 765,· 259 N.Y.S. 
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Richmond Times Dispatch, March -~~ 1973 
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An Unusual Foursome 
" .. For the ·, first time since he 
· went on the Supreme Court 15 
months ago, Richmonder Lewis 
F. Powell Jr. has written an 
opinion in which he has been 
joined by the three staunch liber-
als ·on the court but by none of 
the other conservatives. 
Powell and Justices Douglas, 
Brennan and Marshall dissented 
last week from a ruling uphold· 
ing a New York law which re· 
.quires a voter to enroll in the 
party of his choice at least 30 
days before the general election 
in order to vote in the next party 
primary. Under the law, the cut-
off date for enrollment occurs 
' about eight months before a 
, presidential primary and 11 





The three other Nixon ap-
pointees - Burger, Blackmun 
and Rehnquist - and Stewart 
and White held that New York 
had a valid reason for requiring 
party enrollment prior to .a gen-
eral election in order to::i9hibit 
party "raiding." In "raiding," 
the court explained, "voters in 
sympathy with one party desig-
nate themselves as voters of an-
' other party so as to influence or 
determine the results of the other 
party's primary." 
T h e majority quoted, ap-
provingly, a lower court opinion 
' which said that "few persons 
have the effrontery or the fore-
sight to enroll as, say, Republi-
cans so that they can vote in a 
primary some seven months 
hence, when they full well intend 
to vote Democratic in only a few 
I 
week~." On the other hand, arter 
the general election, and close to 
the time of the primary, voters 
might be inclined to cross over 
and try to upset the primary of 
the party they really don't favor, 
according to the ~ajority's opin-
ion. 
But Powell and the three liber-
als saw it differe~tly. 
."Deferment of a right, espe-
cially one as sensitive and essen-
tial as the exercise of the first 
duty of citizen~hip, can be tan-
tamount to its denial," wrote 
Powell. "And any statute which 
imposes for eight or 11 months 
an absolute freeze on party en-
rollment and the consequent 
r i g h t to vote totally dis-
enfranchises a class of persons 
who, for quite legitimate rea-
sons, decide to . register closer 
than eight months to the primary 
date and those WhO, for equally 
I e g i t i m a t e reasons, wish to 
choose or alter party affiliation.'' 
Virginia does not have voter 
enrollment by parties, so the 
New York opinion has no direct 
application here, and we have no 
strong feelings as to the right-
ness or wrongness of the deci-
sion. But Powell did make one 
important point, and that is that 
many people switch parties be-
cause of the individual candi-
dates involved, rather than party 
principles, .and that candidates-
and issues, too - "often are not 
apparent eight to 11 months be-
fore a primary." 
The signficant fact about this 
case, at least as far as Virginia 
is concerned, is not the court's 
finding but, rather, the fact that 
conservative Powell lined up 
with the court's three all-out lib-
erals. In his career as a Supreme · 
Court justice, Powell obviously is 
not going to be doctrinaire; he is 
not going to have a · knee-jerk 
'conservative reaction to issues 
before the court. The evidence is 
that he is following the policy of 
attempting to decide issues sole-
ly on the basis of the law and the 
Constitution. And nothing more 
could be asked of any person oc-
cupying a judicial bench. 
